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BASIC vs APPLIED RESEARCH: 
NEW LINK, NETWORK and PROJECT GOVERNANCE 





Based on a qualitative research approach, this paper explores how four highly successful  biotechnology 
organizations source their most critical input-scientific knowledge and integrate it inside. We selected 
matched pairs of organizations that operated under similar conditions and regulatory regimes 
(Southern Italy) but differed considerably with regard to ownership (public and private). We find that 
scientists enter into large numbers of collaborative research efforts (frequently informal)  with 
scientists at other organizations, especially universities. Formal market contracts are also used to 
govern these exchanges of scientific knowledge. Inside, the main job in integrating new information and 
knowledge, is carried up by few critical connectors.  Our findings suggest that the reputation is the real, 
effective intangible resource at the base of these relational activities for value creation in all the cases. 
We selected the Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) model proposed by Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997 and by 
Teece, 2007, as the core theoretical guideline for the present study. 
Following DCs, we consider the places where basic and applied research meet as  the “critical-zone” for 
value creation in biotech organizations. 
Another analytical tool is the network approach to find and fix the critical organizational dimensions 
under network domains. 
Our findings enable a future research pattern based on a tested informal relation codification. It will be 
possible to implement a quantitative research on a higher number of observations.  
 
This thesis is divided into the following sections. In chapter I, the research topic is presented as an 
empirical, real-changing movement, drawing on the case of USA and its national biotech-innovation 
system, in other words the change in the relational dynamic between basic and applied research. As 
such, the formulation of the general research question emerges out of a simple consideration of the 
corresponding problem for the Italian context, specifically southern Italy. Chapter II deals with the 
method and research questions and describes the modes of organizing the analysis. As the method is 
qualitative and focused on case studies, this section also presents  the theoretical issues we referred to 
for data analysis and evidence discussion. We refer, here, to the dynamic capabilities theoretical 
approach presented mainly in two fundamental articles by Teece et al. on 1997 and by Teece on 2007.  
 Additional theoretical subjects are outlined in chapter III. These arguments complement the 
research context by providing a bird's-eye view at organization analysis  and social network 
contributions. Our attempt is to find some insights into where strategy scholars might look for hidden 
resource for value. Here the fundamental contributions are those of Jones, Hesterly, Borgatti (1997),  of 
Cross, Borgatti, Parker (2002), Cross, Parker (2004), and of Powell and Grodal (2006). The section, 
finally, presents the empirical analysis, starting from firms’ description, data collection  and data 
analysis. In this section we focus more on explaining the construction of the SNA questions and the 
measures of DCs. 
 In Chapter IV the findings are grouped in three key-issues: configuration of Biotech Firms’ 
relational and integrative capabilities and value implications, evidence in terms of process-position-path 
and (organizational) convergence solutions, basic vs applied research networks: governance and 
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Società Chimica Italiana (SCI)/Italian Chemistry Society 
Pisa, lì 10 marzo 2010 
 
“A year ago, in the January-February edition of "Chemistry and Industry”, together with some 
encouraging notes on the progress of the pharmaceutical sector in Italy, and a focus on the biotechnology sector, 
was presented a negative outlook on the future of Italian pharmaceutical research in relation to drugs based on 
molecules of low molecular weight. Prof. Most (Past-President of the Division of Medicinal Chemistry Italian 
Chemical Society) brings out clearly the criticism of the decisions of  heads of major multinational companies 
(Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, in particular) concerning the survival of their research centers in Italy. 
Unfortunately, we can only say that what he said  in the article, in fact, turned out to be a true prophecy. A few 
examples among many: the Center of IRBM in Pomezia  closed its doors, reopening only in recent days, with 
different owners and, above all, with a small staff of about 15% of what it was at the end of 2008, and the result 
was the loss of 200 or more jobs abroad and emigration of a large proportion of highly qualified researchers. The 
Research Center of Cell Therapeutics in Bresso was dismantled and in this case  jobs were lost and a large number 
of researchers were forced to emigrate abroad. Finally, a month ago, GSK  announced the closure within a few 
months of its research center in Verona, the flagship of Italian pharmaceutical research and recognized by WHO as 
a center of excellence for research in neuroscience. Today, the center of Verona, today consists of about 500 
researchers in addition to a large number of operators in other establishments, yet again many of its qualified 
researchers have left for other countries, where, despite the crisis and closure of research centers, investment 
alternatives are created and continue to meet the changes brought about by restructuring and changes to 
strategic plans of large companies. A striking example in this regard is the decision of the British Government to 
reduce taxes on gains from patents in the UK. That decision, we are sure, sets the stage for various multinational 
companies deciding to make additional investments in the United Kingdom. The same GSK announced a few days 
ago that 1,000 new jobs would be created, about half of which in the biotechnology sector, compared to a 
reduction of about 400 positions in its research centers based in the north-east of London.  
 
We believe that the above not only highlight the problems created for individual researchers, no doubt serious 
from a human point of view, but also the situation of pharmaceutical research in Italy has now reached a "tipping 
point" beyond which damage to the so-called sistema paese or "country  system” is imminent and it will be very 
severe and prolonged. The pharmaceutical sector is a sector with high technology and high added value so that it 
can actually create wealth for a country. For this to happen, however, what is needed is investment capacity, 
capability and commitment to long-term planning. Typically, the return of investment in this sector is in the order 
of 10-15 years, and even then the measures taken have marginal and limited effect in the rescue of this strategic 
sector. In the 1960s and ‘70s, our country was at the peak of pharmaceutical research, today it is a strong 
rearguard position, but what was destroyed in 30 years needs  to be rebuilt with a unique vision that looks to both 
the industrial and academic worlds.  
 
The Division of Medicinal Chemistry of the Italian Chemical Society therefore believes that investors and 
institutions can and must find the appropriate forms to ensure the survival of those research centers of excellence 
that still exist in Italy. The immediate action must involve long-term plans whose aim is to reverse the trend of the 
past 30 years with a view to seeing our research flourish and to ensure that our youth are not only appreciated 
abroad, but they find the will and the means to invest in their future in Italy”. 
 
The Division of Medicinal Chemistry of the SCI, in its institutional role, has an interest in chemical and 
pharmaceutical development of culture and promotion of all those academics, industrialists, students, scholars, 
dealing with the chemistry of drugs. In this function, the Division intends to play an active role with public and 
private actors in order to identify those actions aimed at creating a mid-term to long-term sustainability of the 
Italian pharmaceutical research. 
 
The President and the Division of 








This recent statement by the President of the Italian Chemical Society denounces the 
critical situation of research in our country. Numerous research units belonging to many 
chemical companies have reduced investment, resulting in a significant impact on employment 
and subsequently driving skilled researchers abroad (brain drain).  
At the same time, the Italian public research context has been affected by a profound 
transformation. The process of renewal and modernization embracing Public Administration, 
involving all its branches, is now impacting heavily on research actors such as Universities and 
CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche or National Research Council). 
In Italy, the two areas of public and private research, which historically correspond to the 
distinction between basic and applied research, are in effect not linked today. The major 
impulse fuelled by biotechnological innovations has, among other things, reformulated the 
same modes of research management and introduced new forms of governance at the 
organizational level, principally the approach of basic research to the market. 
 
This issue involves macro and micro level argumentations, which we place on a common 
logical path, as follows: 
 
• The case of biotechnologies in Italy – and for EU economies – is a case of 
competitive re-positioning. Global competition moves toward research-based 
frontiers: product and process innovations and, in general, all those intangible, 
high-skilled human capital assets as sources of production of knowledge and 
value. The changing scenario drives  competitive economies to focus more on 
these emerging value-creator industries.  
• At the same time, at firm level the potential opportunities offered by these 
value-creator activities are mostly unknown, as one entrepreneur in our survey 
stated:  “Our business opportunities in the biotechnology field are almost 
unknown, and we are unable to find them by ourselves. These opportunities 
may emerge from direct and indirect collaboration we frequently engage in with 
external actors. The most fruitful business activities have occasionally been 
created during meetings with our production partners, pooling together our 
knowledge. For these reasons I talk of the importance of  the “lateral thinker” 
who can interact pro-actively with the persons he already knows and trusts”. 
These words show and bear witness to the importance of finding a conducive 
environment in which the actors are able to talk each other. 
• There is an additional condition for research-based organizations in southern 
Italy: local assisted governance, until the recently founded Competence Centers, 
had failed insofar as integration between Research and Industry is concerned. 
This failure, to be argued and supported with some evidence in chapter 1, may 
be considered in terms of inefficient coordination between the “locus” of 
research and industry.  
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The current scenario poses different problems of both a structural, organizational and 
technological nature. These dynamic variables contribute to create a “volatile environment” 
or, in other words, a context where the ability to adapt is critical. 
 
To give an idea of the complexity of this phenomenon, we can refer directly to the  
introduction of Powell’s study on the Network of Innovators, published by Oxford University 
Press, in 2006: 
“In February of 2001, two rival consortia published rough draft (roughly 90 per cent 
complete) sequences of the human genome in Nature and Science. The “public” Human 
Genome Project consisted of five key institutions and eleven collaborations, supported by the 
US National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, and the Wellcome Trust in the United 
Kingdom. The rival “private” consortia, led by the biotech firm Celera, included both 
commercial firms and academic researchers from the University of California, Penn State, Case 
Western, Johns Hopkins, Cal Tech, Yale, Rockefeller, as well as scientists in Spain, Israel, and 
Australia. These projects have been acclaimed for their remarkable scientific achievement; 
they were also the product of considerable organizational innovation. ..The Human Genome 
Project (HGP) and the Celera team were pluralist, multiorganizational and multinational 
confederations. These two groups were intensely rivalrous, but collaborated intensively within 
their own groups (Lambright, 2002). HGP involved management by two government agencies 
and a private British foundation that coordinated activities in government labs, universities, 
and nonprofit institutions in the US and England. As the lead firm, Celera’s organization was 
more focused, but its research team included scientists and state-of-the-art equipment at 
private firms, public and private universities, and nonprofit institutes in four countries. 
Both projects were organized as large-scale networks, and their rivalry spurred each side 
to engage in a high-stakes learning race. While the cost, scale, and distributed nature of these 
projects may have been unusual, the form of organization-collaboration across multiple 
organizational boundaries and institutional forms-is no longer rare. Indeed many analysts have 
noted that the model of network of innovators has become common place over the past two 
decades (Powell, 1990; Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996; Roberts and Liu, 2001; Chesbrough, 
2003). 
Collaboration among ostensible rivals was once regarded as provisional or transitional 
step taken to enter new markets, spread risks, or to share early stage  R&D costs (Mowery, 
1988). Such forays were often followed by mergers  as the transitory activities became 
incorporated inside the boundaries of the firm. Recent studies suggest, however, that various 
forms of interorganizational partnerships are now core components of corporate strategy. 
Even where these linkages endure for relatively lengthy periods of time, they do not entail 
vertical integration (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1996;  Noteboom, 1999; Ahuja, 
2000)….Many studies of interfirm networks draw data from a single point in time and thus do 
not examine how collaborations unfold over time. Even studies that do look at dynamics tend 
to do so from the perspective of a dyad. Initially, the choice by a young firm of whom to 
partner with is often driven by resource needs. As both firms and network mature, various 
dyadic choices increasingly reflect structural properties of the network. Thus, the existing 
network structure shapes research behavior. Consequently, networks both enable 
information to become knowledge and determine the nature of knowledge (Kogut, 2000). But 
we do not, as yet, have a parallel understanding of the management and governance of 
networks to accompany analysis of structure and topology. Concerns with how the parties in a 
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relationship adapt to changing circumstances, or attend to the incentives to adjust the 
relationship to make improvements remain largely unexamined”. 
 
This paper seeks to address the challenges outlined above.  We present its core 
contribution, with a brief illustration (see Fig. A) and description in the following section, 
starting from the methodological choice and, subsequently, through a presentation of the 
derived theoretical logic. 
The research method applied is qualitative and based on case studies. The research 
process is inductive and, for this reason, there is a cycle of alternation between data collection 
and analysis. In other words, guided by an initial research question (how to address the supply 
of basic research in southern Italy), we collected a first set of data (two early case studies). At 
this point we began to analyze data and, guided by emerging theoretical directions/paths (until 
the formation of derived research logic), a second set of data was collected.  
The emergence of derived research logic follows argumentation of the notion of 
collective invention (Allen, 1983) and the subsequent scientific debate on University-Industry 
relationships (Owen-Smith, Riccaboni, Pammolli, Powell, 2002). With regard to 
biotechnologies, important contributions compare the evolution and structure of the biotech 
sector in the United States and in Europe, and consider the implications for European 
competitiveness in the same sector (Sharp, Senker, 1999). More recently, other research works 
conducted on the same issue (Owen-Smith, et al., 2002; Owen-Smith, Powell, 2004) have 
shown how systematic variation in the composition of networks across nations, and within 
regions, influences the ability to integrate scientific, clinical and commercial expertise. Of 
particular importance for biomedical innovation are linkages between scientific research and 
commercial and clinical development. Owen-Smith et al (2002) identify two macro-level 
capabilities that influence these linkages: integrative and relational capabilities. These refer 
respectively to the ability of scientists to move back and forth between basic science and 
clinical development, and to the ability of organizations within an innovation system to 
collaborate with other, diverse organizations. 
On a different research trajectory, the Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) theoretical view (Teece 
et al. 1997; Teece, 2007), in adhering to a firm-level research approach, focuses attention on 
environmental dynamism and on the specific responses the organization may give to it. At the 
same time, given its strategic vision, the framework underscores the importance of 
interpreting, in advance, the dominant industrial structure and market competition. 
Competitive advantage may arise only for the firm that recognizes and applies environmental 
priorities by using its dynamic capabilities. “Dynamic capabilities assist in achieving 
evolutionary fitness, in part by helping to shape environment. The element of dynamic 
capabilities that involve shaping (and not just adapting to) the environment is entrepreneurial 
in nature. Arguably, entrepreneurial fitness ought to have equal standing with evolutionary 
fitness (Teece, 2007. Pg. 1321)”. Where the market changes, this ability to understand the 
context must be, in turn, dynamic. 
For our analysis, we choose to observe firm-level capabilities (following the DCs 
methodological  guideline) that, we assume, are represented by relational and integrative 
capabilities (R&ICs) to connect basic and applied research. The specific research question, 
therefore, looks at HOW the organization recognizes and applies R&ICs. Starting from the 
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A fundamental feature of this research is evident in the methodological approach; it is 
qualitative and based on case studies and, consequently, the research process consists in the 
alternate repetition of collecting and analyzing data.  It is a process that starts from the open 
code phase, based on a broad definition of the research target, and goes on to select codes, 
namely the research phase in which the theoretical framework and specific research questions 
are defined. The process may be stopped at a certain point and then resumed in a subsequent 
phase when research questions may be updated on an increasing number of firms, moving 
toward a new theoretical and more comprehensive framework.  
To date, our results will give two order of contributions: 
a. a specific codification of some critical connections and 
b. some interesting implications regarding the following items: 
 
1. Configuration of biotechnology firms’ relational and integrative capabilities and        
value  implications.  
2. Evidence in terms of process-position-path and (organizational) convergence solutions. 
3. Intangible assets at the base of strategic processes in biotech firms. 
4. Basic vs applied research networks: governance and incentive issues.   
 
Item number 1: we found that scientists in the four biotechnology firms we studied enter 
into a large numbers of collaborative research efforts with scientists from other organizations, 
especially universities. Formally, market contracts are used to govern these exchanges of 
scientific knowledge, yet a sizeable portion of value is accumulated around few critical 
connectors through informal relations. 
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Item number 2: as required by the DCs theoretical framework, we organize data  on the 
three dimensions of process-position-path. Within this framework, the cases appear in their 
complexity but what is interesting is the fact that they adopt common organizational solutions 
to a wide application of reputation management.  
Item number 3: a direct consequence of the previously mentioned item 2, concerning the 
use of reputation as an intangible, strategic tool. 
Item number 4: in a network dominion, rents are distributed more effectively if 
considered  on the basis of reciprocity. This consideration may change the incentives mode and, 
consequently, address governance behavior.   
 
Finally, our research findings point to the dominant use of boundary-spanning1 social 
networks by the four biotech firms. This configuration  increases both their learning and their 
flexibility in ways that would not be possible within a self-contained hierarchical organization. 
In such an environment, reputation is a key-management tool to know and use and it may be 
considered an intangible asset for the strategic process. 
 In order to provide effective support to the relationship between basic and applied 
research in the field of biotechnologies, it will be important to consider the role of the State as 
creator of conducive environments for selecting "social value". 
 
            This thesis is divided into the following sections. In chapter I, the research topic is 
presented as an empirical, real-changing movement, drawing on the case of USA and its 
national biotech-innovation system, in other words the change in the relational dynamic 
between basic and applied research. As such, the formulation of the general research question 
emerges out of a simple consideration of the corresponding problem for the Italian context, 
specifically southern Italy.  Chapter II deals with the method and research questions and 
describes the modes of organizing the analysis. As the method is qualitative and focused on 
case studies, this section also presents  the theoretical issues we referred to for data analysis 
and evidence discussion. We refer, here, to the dynamic capabilities theoretical approach 
presented mainly in two fundamental articles by Teece et al. on 1997 and by Teece on 2007.  
 Additional theoretical subjects are outlined in chapter III. These arguments complement 
the research context by providing a bird's-eye view at organization analysis  and social network 
contributions. Our attempt is to find some insights into where strategy scholars might look for 
hidden resource for value. Here the fundamental contributions are those of Jones, Hesterly, 
Borgatti (1997),  of Cross, Borgatti, Parker (2002), Cross, Parker (2004), and of Powell and 
Grodal (2006). The section, finally, presents the empirical analysis, starting from firms’ 
description, data collection  and data analysis. In this section we focus more on explaining the 
construction of the SNA questions and the measures of DCs. 
 In Chapter IV the findings are grouped in three key-issues: configuration of BFs’ 
relational and integrative capabilities and value implications, evidence in terms of process-
position-path and (organizational) convergence solutions, basic vs applied research networks: 
governance and incentive issues.  Finally, there will be the ending notes and the future research 
agenda. 
 
                                                 
1
  We use the term boundary-spanning networks  to refer to those networks in which the connecting role played by 
some critical nodes may be expressed not only in transferring knowledge, but also in translating and transforming 











CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL RESEARCH TARGET 
 
 
1.1 Basic vs applied research: a changing environment 
Over the past decade there has been, for USA, a remarkable shift in the division of labor of R&D 
process among universities, industry and the federal government.  
This transformation is most pronounced in the life sciences and the commercial fields of 
medicine, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. The post-cold war focus of federal science and 
technology policy on “competitiveness” has been noted by many observers, and the intensified 
interest in basic research and collaborative product development by large private corporations 
in various high-technology fields has been widely studied.  
The accompanying change in the mandate of research universities toward a greater focus on 
commercializing research findings is understood from more recent contributions (Powell, 
Owen-Smith 2000). Throughout much of the post-World War II era there was a relatively clear 
distinction between basic and applied research, with the former the domain of the university 
and the latter the turf of business. The federal government, outside of defense-related 
research, supported the creation of an infrastructure for basic research and, through the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), funded 
individual scientists as well. University research was basic in the sense that it aimed to 
understand phenomena at a fundamental level. The NSF defines basic science as research 
whose objective is a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than 
a practical application thereof. So, universities focused more on the R side of R&D continuum, 
while much of industry eschewed basic research because the payoffs were either too long-run 
or difficult to appropriate. The great bulk of industrial R&D was focused on shorter-term 
problem solving. With the ending of four decades of rivalry and conflict with the Soviet Union, 
the rationale for federal science and technology expenditures has been reoriented toward 
programs that enhance economic “competitiveness” (NAS 1992; Cohen and Noll 1994; 
Slaugther and Rhoades 1996). 
There is a growing federal view that research universities can and should play a larger and 
more direct role in assisting industry and promoting national competitiveness. Universities are 
being urged by federal government to seek more direct partnership with business in the 
development and commercialization of new technologies. 
The shift in federal policy – from basic research to increased concern over its application – is 
reflected in legislation, funding plans, and joint agreements. These legislative changes sparked 
a considerable upsurge in licensing, as well as rapid growth in the number of university-
industry research centers, cooperative research and development agreements, federally 
funded research and development centers, and industry-university research consortia. 
Accompanying these initiatives has been significant change in funding policies. At the NSF, 
numerous programs have been developed to promote university-industry collaboration, and 
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funding in some engineering and science and technology fields requires that NSF-supported 
centers have an industrial component.  
The life sciences represent the cutting edge of these developments, in part because of the large 
number of start-up companies created with the assistance or direct involvement of academic 
researchers (Zucker, Darby and Brewer 1994). The biotechnology industry is remarkably 
clustered in but few areas – San Diego, The Bay Area, Boston, Seattle and Philadelphia and 
Houston – with close proximity to major universities, research-oriented hospitals, and cancer-
treatment facilities. Physical, intellectual and economic integration between firms and 
universities is so pronounced that they constitute a common technological community (Powell 
1996). One reason that the life sciences are rather unusual is that biotechnology represents a 
novel case of an industry that was developed inside the university2. The initial discoveries were 
made by university scientists, who then also played a leading role in the introduction and 
development of the new ideas. Biotechnology has thus largely collapsed the distinction 
between basic and applied science: fundamental new discoveries, such as gene therapy, have 
immediate scientific and medical importance as well as enormous commercial relevance 
(Powell, Owen-Smith, 2000) 3. 
The Italian system of governance in research is, likewise, in need of a change in the division of 
labor between universities, industry and the national government. The central problem lies, 
more or less, in the inefficiency of public research institutions (University may be considered 
“under construction” at this point in time) and the low grade of investment in R&D on the part 
of private industry. This consideration could be understood as an abstract and pointless 
criticism but, even in its general formulation, it brings our initial attention onto a deeper 
analysis of certain aspects of our research system.   
Starting from the case of biotechnology, it may be interesting to explore whether the Italian 
research system is apparently geared toward real integration between basic and applied 
research. 
Without any doubt, the changing movement of the global competitive scenario is forcing many 
countries whose economies are based on the development of traditional industries, such as 
Italy, to shift the attention of their industrial policy toward research-based sectors.  
Not surprisingly, the biotechnology industry is considered one of the most important strategic 
sectors for the competitive re-positioning of the Italian economy. While the bulk of biotech 
firms are clustered in Italy's northern regions, biotech initiatives are significantly lagging behind 
in the rest of the country.  In other words, the Italian biotech industry can best be described by 
drawing on two fundamental references; one is our previous research4, the aim of which is to 
provide a new data base consistent with OECD statistical standards, and a second work 
                                                 
2
  For a wider explanation of the relationships between science and technology and of the subsequent implications 
for growth theory,  see Nelson, Rosenberg, 1999.  
3 
 The evidence is provided in Powell, Owen-Smith 2000, and  is demonstrated by using data on university 
patenting and royalties derived from university licensing, and also by showing the increased role of industry 
funding of university research in the field of health-sciences as well as the noticeable changes in the labor market 
for the biological scientist. Finally, two universities at the forefront of research in the life sciences and its 
commercialization are viewed. 
4 
D’Amore, R. and Vittoria, M.P. (2010) ‘Assessing statistical standards for emerging industries. Applying OECD 
statistical codes to Italian biotech population lists’, World Review of Science, Technology and Sustainable 




developed within a STOA Master's course (2009)5. The former shows the distribution of Italian 




Table 1: Italian biotech firm distribution, 2005 







Active & Innovative BFs 189 1  
Dedicated BFs 61   
tot 
 
  251 
R&D 58 278  
targeted 83   
Other services 110 85  
tot 
 
  614 
Source: D’Amore, Vittoria, 2010 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the Italian biotech industry is essentially made up of service activities (70%), 
of which  45% are non-profit R&D biotech firms (essentially academic research centers) 
followed by other service firms (these include environmental service firms and other non-profit 
organizations such as local environmental agencies, scientific and technological/technology 
parks, public foundations, etc.), and finally by targeted firms (13%) acting solely as suppliers of 
biotech product/processes. Profit-making R&D biotech firms are less numerous and include 
research enterprises located in scientific and technological/technology parks or private 
laboratories acting in specific market segments. 
As regards production activities, the main operator is the innovative firm (55%), a category 
which includes established firms already acting in other sectors (pharmaceutical or chemical) 
that adopt biotech innovations. This production constellation means that, in Italy, it is easier to 
find the innovative biotech adopters within established firms rather than in new, biotech-
focused activities.   
 
What emerges from the second analysis of the southern Italy biotech context is the weakness of 
the local R&D system in terms of the low rate of investment in research. The data show the low 
incidence of industrial investment in R&D and a greater portion from public research (also 
expressed in terms of number of employees).         
 





                                                 
5
 We specifically refer, here, to a research study conducted on the STOA  Master in International and Local 
Development (MILD) on “Market Internationalization and Foreign Investment attraction: new opportunities and 
industries for local development. An insight into the Genetic Industry of Campania Region (ge.NET.work)”. 
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Table 2: Swot analysis on genetic industry in Campania Region 
Strengths  
Public structural endowments in research; 
High-skilled human capital; 
Presence of a prestigious university and 
activation of specific degree courses; 
Specialization in red (medical) biotech. 
 
Weaknesses 
Lack of coordination in public research and 
few ties with firms and institutions;  
Lack of managerial skills in research; 
Low level attractiveness of the territory; 
Few firms and small-sized enterprises; 
Low R&D investments; 
Lack of significant patents. 
 
Opportunities  
Sector in constant growth; 
Private equity funding; 
Funding of New Community Program; 
Many sectors and productive activities involved 
in biotech applications. 
Threats 
Brain drain; 
International new emerging competitors; 
Exclusion from the processes of knowledge 
diffusion. 
 
Source: ge.NET.work, 2008. MILD/STOA’ 
 
 
What emerges from the evidence is a sector basically formed of R&D units and of targeted firms 
(data at national level) mainly clustered in Biotech Communities located in northern Italy, whilst  
the biotech sector in southern Italy is less developed in the number of both manufacturing and 
services firms. In Campania there are few but excellent research centers more oriented toward 
international research partners and far less connected with the local industrial base. 
The question arising from these data concerns the reasons behind  this weakness. In other 
words, is it a weakness due to the economic structure of southern Italy or, rather more subtly, is 
it due to the lack of real integration between the locus of research and Industry?6 
 
 
1.2 General research target 
The need for real change in the modes of connecting basic and applied biotech research is also 
testified by Italian and European government policies7. 
                                                 
6 
The second part of the question may arise from a research perspective of industrial policy that finds justifications 
for governmental intervention, beyond issues of market failure, in the strategic dimension and in meta-economic 
objectives (Bellandi, Di Tommaso 2006).  The perspective may include a wider consideration of welfare in terms of 
social value. We will consider this approach  in our concluding remarks. 
 
7 
The EU is striving to create a single European Research Area that encourages knowledge transfer through 
networks of world-class European researchers. Cooperation between European countries is further encouraged 
through cutting-edge infrastructure and joint policy-making for research. The most concrete manifestation of EU 
research and innovation policy is the Seventh Framework Programme 2007-2013 (FP7).  
 There are four strands to FP7: 
•  Cooperation: this involves collaborative research in health, food, agriculture, fisheries, 
biotechnology, information and communication technologies, energy, the environment (including climate 
change), transport (including aeronautics), socioeconomic sciences and the humanities, space and 
security. It also covers nano-sciences, nano-technologies, materials and new production technologies; 




National and regional policies in the field of research and Competitiveness for the period 2007-
2013 include some fundamental interventions8 that tend to harmonize with EU policies.  
Specifically, if we look at life sciences and the more recent policies conducted for the biotech 
innovation system of southern Italy, we find the creation of Competence Centers. These may be 
considered, among the various policy tools, the most representative in this field. Since 2003, the 
Regional Competence Centers (GEAR, BIOTEKNET and DFM) have been created as a result of  
the National Operational Programme “Scientific Research, Technological Development, Higher 
Training" for 2000-2006. Its aim is to  enhance research and innovation in southern Italy, 
support scientific and technological development in companies, strengthen centers of 
excellence and human resources in the areas of research, principally science and technology. In 
other words, their mission is  to match the contexts of basic and applied research expressed in 
terms of the distance between University and Industry research.   
 
In such a scenario, our attention is centered on the “locus” of integration between basic and 
applied research in the field of biotechnology, whilst our research question focuses on the 
fitness/suitability of the organization to integrate basic and applied research resources located 
in southern Italy (see fig.1). 
 
 
1.3 Basic and applied research in the innovation process: modeling and definitions  
To conclude this section, we give, firstly, a current conceptual distinction among basic, applied 
research and development9. And than, some notes about the models that describe the 
innovation process. Although in the next section we will discuss, more extensively, about the 
theoretical yardsticks which gave rise to the more recent debate on the role of basic and 
applied research in the innovation process,  here we start from the following, generic, 
definitions: 
                                                                                                                                                              
•  People: this covers human resources and includes scholarships for young researchers, fellowships 
for lifelong training and career development, partnerships between industry and academia and awards for 
excellence; 
•  Capacities: funding here upgrades research infrastructures, supports research and development 
by small businesses, develops knowledge and science clusters and promotes scientific knowledge in 
general. 
 In order to meet the objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy, and thus stimulate growth and 
employment in Europe, a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) has been adopted for the 
period 2007-2013. The Programme supports measures to strengthen competitiveness and innovation capacity in 
the European Union. It particularly encourages the use of information technologies, environmental technologies 
and renewable energy sources. 
 
8
 We refer to the National Strategic Plan (QSN) and the National Operation Programme (PON) Research and 
Competitiveness, while regional policy is summarized in the Operational Programme sub European FESR and in the 
Action Plan for Regional Economic Development (Paser). 
9
 The most important official source in this field is “OECD (1962), The Measurement of Scientific and Technical 
Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development, DAS/PD/62.47”. The 
so-called OECD Frascati manual. Adopted by member countries in 1963, the manual is a methodological document 
for conducting surveys on research and development (R&D). It has been revised several times. In 2002 the 6th 
edition was published.  
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Basic research: it is a research activity which aims to achieve knowledge without direct 
application purposes, based on pure intellectual curiosity and a willingness to discover the 
fundamental laws that explain the phenomena of nature. 
Basic research explores what is unknown, extending the field as possible, and produce general 
and theoretical knowledge. 
 
 
 Figure 1 
 General research target 
 












Applied research:  it is a research activity designed to achieve specific results applications, and 
explore ways and alternative methods for achieving practical ends. It produces models, 
methods and prototypes. 
Development: It is the efforts to move from prototype to the proper production phase.  
This phase involves a search of details that usually ends up absorbing large amounts of 
economic resources. 
Obviously the development is carried out mainly by the industrial firms and based on a 
commercial purpose, that is, with the aim of creating a new product to sell or a new technology 
to be applied in the production process. 
The literature of economics of innovation has long been to study the phases of the innovation 
process. Many scholars have systematized  the stages needed for a scientific discovery to reach 
the market. Since the variation of characters in science, technology as well as of the market (in 
the new needs of the customers), these phases are provided in a linear sequence (basic 
research-applied research-development-production-market) or non-linear (i.e. integrated, with 
a central role of design, or with frequent feedbacks). What happened in the case of 
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biotechnology - which we discussed in section 1.1 - has impacted on the process of many new 
products or processes.   
The change has led to the possibility of selling the results of basic research.  
This does not mean that it was eliminated the need for applied research. It is impossible to deny 
the fundamental linearity of the innovation process of many bio-pharmaceutical 
products/processes. But it means that it was added new actors/firms in the same process. 
This is very clear in the case of sequencing (see an evidence in the box below. It concerns the 
famous case involving two different actors – public and private research networks – in the race 
to decode the entire human genome. We have already talk about it in the introduction to the 
present paper. Now, it is important to note how the economies of scale in basic research – see 
the introduction of new machines for sequencing and the entrepreneurial ability of a scientist – 
may impact on the performances. This history also witnesses the critical role of intellectual 





Until sequencing was performed manually, the project to decode the entire human genome had seemed a 
fantasy. But with the advent of automated techniques, influent people began to support the feasibility and utility. 
In 1986 Nobel laureate Renato Dulbecco appealed to the U.S. government to support this effort to support cancer 
research. In Great Britain, Sydney Brenner - future winner of a Nobel Prize - urged the EU to do likewise. 
The Department of Energy of the United States of America, which had been commissioned to study the effects of 
radiation on DNA, seized the opportunity and declared in 1986 that "knowledge of the human genome is so 
necessary for the continued progress medicine and other health sciences as knowledge of human anatomy has 
been for the current medicine".  
 
But other scientists and other institutions such as the National Institute of Health in the United States 
were skeptical, some consider the task too ambitious and costly, others thinking that it would distract from other 
financial and intellectual capital research in genetics more feasible. At the end of the decade, the decision had 
been taken. The international Human Genome Project, funded by governments and charities, was launched in 1990 
under the leadership of James Watson. He aims to decode the 3 billion base pairs, which are written in the genetic 
instructions of humanity, a view that would have required, according to its makers, 15 years of work and $ 3 billion.  
The project was of such large proportions that the last thing that we could expect was the competition. Yet in 1998, 
when the public consortium had deciphered only 3% of the code, the private sector launched the challenge. Craig 
Venter, the geneticist who had identified more genes than anyone else, concluded a transaction of 300 million 
dollars with the largest producer of machines for sequencing DNA in order to produce its version of the genome. 
With a new technique he invented, called "shot" sequencing of the entire genome, his company called Celera, 
promised to finish in just 2-3 years, long before the scheduled date of completion of the public project. Watson had 
won the first major competition of genetic era - in 1957 - having discovered the structure of DNA. Now he was 
about to start another competition, which would prove to be one of the most sharp disputes of the modern era. 
 
The human genome is too large to be read in one single stroke. Therefore, was to be separated into 
sections appropriate to the capacity of the sequencing machines and the two rival groups faced this problem in two 
different ways. 
 
... If the two groups were separated only by different professional approach would have been possible a 
relationship of cordiality. But they had a different worldview. The Human Genome Project saw the genetic code as 
a universal property of mankind and record the results in a public database, GenBank, as soon as they were 
available. Celera: there it was to obtain profits. 
 
Although Venter had forced its lenders to freely publish their data, he also had a deal to manage. Celera 
hoped to sell access to a powerful database of genes, complete of software, which companies could use to find 
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new genes and create new drugs. University researchers could have free access by paying, however, the rights to 
all commercial products created through the database. 
 
This was an anathema to scientists such as John Sulston, who led the British contribution to the public 
project. They regarded Venter as a kind of pirate of gene, who tried to steal something that belonged to all in order 
to gain benefits for himself and for his funders. Although Venter always declare that the genome could not be 
patented, there was concern that Celera would try to privatizing it. The Human Genome Project accelerated its 
efforts, hoping to block any attempt at privatization, making the data available to all before his rival could claim 
rights. 
 
Celera kept his word and made public its results, and its database was so useful that the majority of public 
scientific institutions and pharmaceutical companies will subscribe. The change of movement of the public project, 
however, precluded any possibility that the genome was patented. In 2004, after Venter had broken with its 
lenders and had resigned from Celera, the genome as a reference was even added to GenBank, free from any 
restriction of access. The genome war was over and the fierce rivalry had been useful to mankind. The stimulus of 











































CHAPTER 2 –  THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
 
The present section is dedicated to expose our research process. As an inductive/qualitative 
methodological approach, it has been characterized by a previous knowledge of the subjects 
being investigated.   More precisely, the research process,  summarized in fig. 2, has been 
characterized by a substantial alternation between the phases of data collection and analysis. 
The research method was largely dictated by the nature of research problem. We set out to 
study the dynamics of relations between public research organizations (PROs) and industry in 
biotechnology, where the classical setting which consider basic and applied research in a clear 
cut division between the two kind of actors probably is changing. The incoming relational 
dimension (more in terms of social processes) which account for the efficiency of basic and 
applied research flow, is not jet explored for southern Italy biotechnologies’ research system.  In 
addition, it was our intention to define more precisely the nature of intra and inter-
organizational relations of the constituent groupings within this class. 
The emergent and complex nature of these issues did not favor the quantitative investigation. 
In our view a qualitative approach was more appropriate because of the processual/dynamic 
nature of the phenomenon investigated (Bryman, 1999). In other words, we expect that the 
phenomenon is going through an evolutionary/critical phase, as already happens in other 
countries (USA), but we certainly do not know how the relationship between basic and applied 
research in this field are explicit in our country. We also know that using a theoretical 
framework such as the DCs can function to interpret and understand the basic research 
problem (on regard of emergent organization of R&D in biotech field) but that the research 
process should be complemented by additional analytical tools that help the specific 
exploration of relationship dynamics.   
The text that follows will be organized starting from an analysis of the theoretical arguments 
that the literature has offered on the issue of relations between basic and applied research in 
the innovation process. Then, will be showed the process of construction of the “derived 
research logic” as the algorithm for the exploration of the case studies.  
 
 
2.1  Basic AND applied research for innovation: theoretical issues and open problems 
Innovation economics is based on the identification of the inventive process with Research and 
Development (R&D) activities or, better with the complex activities it was agreed to collect and 
statistically define R&D activities (Antonelli, 1982). As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
there is, on this issue, the most important statistical reference in the OECD Frascati Manual. It 
represents a massive rationale to set indicators, limits and deviations. So we have, among the 
inputs of the R&D process, the research expenditures, the number of employee, etc, while, 
among the outputs, the number of patents and the number of new products introduced in the 




Figure 2: The research process 
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On regard of research on innovation, the economists have overly focused on just one variable: 
the degree of market power that a firm or firms may have. 
Schumpeter was among the first to declare that perfect competition was incompatible with 
innovation. In particular, schumpeterian position, as advanced by Kamien and Swartz (1982), is 
that innovation is greater in monopolistic industries than in competitive ones because 
innovators with monopoly power can use this power to exclude imitators, and the resulting 
higher profits can be used to finance R&D10. The Schumpeterian trade-off between firm size, 
degree of market concentration and innovation was, for long time, largely accepted together 
with the consideration that market mechanisms do not yield an optimal resource allocation for 
innovative activities11. 
                                                 
10
 In addition, large firms are considered more innovative than small firms because there are economies of scale in 
R&D, because large firms are better able to exploit unforeseen innovations, and because indivisibilities in cost-
reducing innovations make them more profitable for large firms (Teece, 1999). 
11
 The public nature of technology implies that profit-motivated agents will not undertake costly research if their 
outcome can be appropriated by other competing agents. Underinvestment in innovative activities as compared to 
the social optimum will result as a consequence. On the other hand, a private monopolist, unthreatened by 
potential entrants, will also engage in insufficient research. Fixed costs and indivisibilities are by definition sources 
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Thus, the role of institutions as the patent system or the involvement of the government in 
support of innovative activities can therefore be discussed and justified. On the same level of 
analysis, the consideration of the market failures associated with the exchange and evaluation 
of technical information provides the basis for understanding some important features of the 
organization of research activities, such as the relative advantages of internalizing R&D within 
firms as opposed to its decentralization in specialized organizations selling their research in the 
marketplace (Mowery, 1983), or the relative efficiency of small and large companies in 
generating innovations (Arrow, 1983). Following this approach, by considering technology as 
information about the methods of production of any one good (Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta, 1988; 
Dasgupta, Stoneman, 1987), consequently, as a durable public good, once produced, 
technology is freely available to everybody, private producers of technical knowledge would 
not  be able to appropriate the value of their output fully. Here the rate of innovation and 
market structure, in any one industry, can be analyzed as the equilibrium outcome of a race for 
the acquisition of valuable information among profit-maximizing competing agents, and the 
utilization of game-theoretic methods as analytical devices to investigate them.  The analysis of 
innovative activities is viewed as a rational decision to allocate resources to the acquisition of 
information in a market context12 13. 
Starting from this position but gradually moving away from it, there were a great bulk of studies 
that showed the enormous number of variables that can potentially intervene between the 
generation of monopolistic rents and the allocation of resources to the development of new 
products and processes
14
.   
The debate was, mainly,  focused on  the more complex nature of technology and innovative 
activities. Particularly, 
 
a.  the deeper exploration of the complex word of basic and applied research, for long time 
considered the “black box” of economic models, started with the fundamental book of 
Nathan Rosenberg (1982) (and with the subsequent publications of Rosenberg, 1994; 
Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994, Nelson and Rosenberg, 1999), on the state of scientific 
knowledge and its relationship with technology. These researches have led the economists 
to recognize the endogeneity of science in economy’s development (i.e. the contribution 
of scientific advance to the promotion of technology is basically a byproduct of the 
scientific enterprise and, more, by creating new knowledge, Science, almost inadvertently 
sheds light on certain technological problems, and spotlights certain technological 
opportunities that had not be seen before). And, more, they led to the suggestion to 
adopt, in the formal growth model, an evolutionary approach  to the role of technological 
change.  
                                                                                                                                                              
of scale economies. Uncertainty entails again a suboptimal resource allocation to innovative activities in the 
absence of a complete set of contingency markets (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942; Arrow, 1962). 
12
 The properties of the solution are than a function of variables related to the nature of the competitive threats 
and incentives implied by market structure and by some features of technology: the expected profitability of the 
innovation, the size of the demand for the products of the industry, the risk of being pre-empted by competitors, 
the degree to which  the revenues  from innovation can be reaped by the innovator or can be earned by imitators, 
the level and structure of R&D costs, etc. 
13
 In particular, science and technology can, in principle, be considered as social organizations which differ only in 
terms of the goals that guide them. Science implies complete publicness of the results of the research, whilst 
technology entails the private appropriation of such results and therefore encourages secrecy. 
14
 For an overview, see Freeman (1982), Pavitt (1987), Dosi (1988). 
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b. Technology, far from being a public good, involves also important private aspects which 
are related not only to the protection provided by patents and secrecy but also to its tacit 
and specific nature. As a consequence, the transfer of technical knowledge is costly, time-
consuming and difficult (Pavitt, 1987). 
c. Technological advances are built upon some portion of publicly available knowledge – 
which may be located in universities, other research institutions or other industries and 
firms –and upon the development of the internal, specific and tacit capabilities of any one 
company (Orsenigo, 1989). 
d. Innovative activities involve differentiated learning procedures which range from highly 
formalized R&D to informal processes of learning-by-doing and-using, to design, 
production engineering, etc. (David, 1975; Rosenberg, 1982). The search for new technical 
solutions involves a high degree of coordination and interdependence among all these 
learning activities and other different corporate functions. 
 
At the downstream of these contributions there were a wide acceptation of the fact that the 
organizational and institutional system supporting innovation has become increasingly complex, 
involving a variety of agents and institutions and highly articulated relationships between them 
(Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1986). 
What emerges, at this point, as a necessary upgrade, is that market structure, considered until 
now the first explicative variable of the technical change, become in itself an endogenous 
variable of the same process. The technical advance becomes in partly shaped by the past 
history of success and failures in innovation and by the specific properties of the relevant 
technology (Nelson, Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1984).  
In order to capture these features of the process of innovation, the notions of technological 
paradigms and trajectories15 (Dosi, 1982; 1984) and of technological regimes16 (Nelson, Winter, 
1982) have been proposed as conceptual tools for the analysis of the determinants and 
procedures of technical change. Market mechanisms affect the rate and directions of 
technological advances within the boundaries of any one paradigm. 
Following these ideas, is reinforced the belief that the underlying properties of technological 
innovation, generally applicable, might lead toward the identification of organizational 
requirements of innovation process.  
 
Emerging frameworks in innovation economics, in this phase, tend to shift the market structure-
innovation debate toward a new domain where internal structure and interfirm agreements 
attain new significance. It finds many criticisms in the same monopoly structure and in the 
subsequent financial need at the base of innovation: with or without the internal cash flow, 
there is the inefficiency of capital markets. The Schumpeterian view of the innovation process 
appears to be one that involves full integration, from research, development, manufacturing 
                                                 
15
 A technological paradigm can be defined as a pattern of solution of selected techno-economic problems based on 
highly selected principles derived from the natural sciences (Dosi, 1982; 1988).  
16
 The notion of technological regimes provides the basis for the analysis of the sectoral differences in the 
determinants and procedures of innovative activities. In this view, each technology can be characterized as a 
specific combination of particular knowledge bases, sources and degrees of technological opportunities, conditions 
of appropriability, forms and degrees of cumulativeness of technological advances.  
A more wider conceptualization will be given by Nelson (1993) in showing that technological development is 
considered a location-specific phenomenon, rooted in the skills, capabilities and knowledge that accumulate over 
time in the National Innovation System (NIS). Many research contributions will follow it. Specifically for 
biotechnologies (see Bartholomew, 1997). 
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and marketing. But the financial requirements associated with developing and commercializing 
new products and processes can be accomplished with myriad organizational arrangements 
including research joint ventures, coproduction, and comarketing arrangements. With such 
arrangements, there is the possibility that the capital requirements associated with a new 
project could be drastically reduced for the innovator. Economies of scale and scope can often 
be captured through interfirm arrangements. 
 
Among the discussed properties of technological innovation, the aspects of uncertainty17, path 
dependency18, cumulative nature19, irreversibilities, technological interrelatedness20, 
tacitness21, inappropriability22 are identified by the literature (Teece, 1999).     
                                                 
17
 “There are various kind of uncertainty. Koopmans (1957) has made a useful distinction between primary and 
secondary uncertainty. Both are critical in the context of innovation. Primary uncertainty arises from “random acts 
of nature and unpredictable changes in concurrent preferences” (Koopmans, 1957. Pg. 162-3); secondary 
uncertainty arises from “lack of communication, that is, from one decision-maker having no-way of finding out the 
concurrent decisions and plans made by others”. Williamson recognizes a third kind of uncertainty, what he calls 
behavioral uncertainty, attributable to opportunism….It is important to note that secondary uncertainty can be 
affected by changing the boundaries of the organization” (Teece, 1999. Pg. 135). 
18
 “Technology often evolves in certain path-dependent ways, contoured and channeled by what might be thought 
of as technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982). A technological paradigm is a pattern of solutions to selected technical 
problems which derives from certain engineering relationships. A paradigm identifies the problems that have to be 
solved and the way to inquire about them; within a paradigm, research efforts become channeled along certain 
trajectories. Relatedly, new product and processes developments for a particular organization are likely to lie in the 
technological neighborhood of previous successes” (Teece, 1999. Pg. 136). 
19
 “Technological development, particularly inside a particular paradigm, proceeds cumulatively along the path 
defined by the paradigm. The fact that technological progress builds on what went before, and that much of it is 
tacit and proprietary, means that it usually has significant organization-specific dimensions. Moreover, an 
organization’s technical capabilities are likely to be “close in” to previous technological accomplishments” (Teece, 
1999. Pg. 136). 
20
 “Innovation is characterized by technological interrelatedness between various subsystems. Linkages to other 
technologies, to complementary assets, and to users must be maintained if innovation is to be successful. If 
recognizable organizational subunits such as R&D, manufacturing and marketing exist, they must be in close and 
continuous communication and engage in mutual adaptation if innovation in commercially relevant products and 
processes is to have a chance of succeeding. Moreover, successful commercial innovation usually requires quick 
decision making and close coupling and coordination among research, development, manufacturing, sales and 
service. Put differently, organizational capacities must exist to enable these activities to occur with dispatch” (Teece, 
1999. Pg. 136). 
21
 “The knowledge developed by organizations is often highly tacit. That is, it is difficult if not impossible to 
articulate and codify (Polanyi, 1962; Winter, 1987). A corollary is that technology transfer is often difficult without 
the transfer of key individuals. This simultaneously explains why imitation is often costly, and why the diffusion of 
new technology often depends on the mobility of engineers and scientists (Teece, 1977; Nelson, Winter, 1982). 
Relatedly, an organization’s technology ought not  be thought  of as residing in some hypothetical book of 
blueprints, or with some hypothetical chief engineer, but in an organization’s system and habits of coordinating and 
managing tasks. These systems and habits have been referred to as organizational routines (Nelson, Winter, 1982). 
It is the performance of these routines that is at the essence of an organization’s technological capacity” (Teece, 
1999. Pg. 136-7). 
22
 “Under many legal systems, the ownership rights associated with technical  know-how are often ambiguous, do 
not always permit rewards that match contribution, vary in the degree of exclusion they permit (often according to 
the innate patentability or copyrightability of the object or subject matter) and are temporary. ….Relatedly, the 
absence of good legal protection presents what Arrow has referred to as the “fundamental paradox of information”. 
In order to provide full information to the buyer, the seller of know-how may have to disclose the object of the 
exchange, but in so doing the basis for the exchange evaporates, or at least erodes, as the potential buyer might 
now have in its possession that which he was seeking to acquire. Hence, transactions in the market for know-how 
must thus proceed under conditions of ignorance. Accordingly, at least until reputations become established, 
exchange is likely to be exposed to hazards. Optimal resource allocation is unlikely to result” (Teece, 1999. Pg. 137). 
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Many organizational distortions (such as bureaucratic decision making, principal-agent 
problems, the trap of an increasing myopia of individuals in organizations, the organizational 
culture and values, etc.23) may impact with firm-level innovation. And the need for a deep 
analysis of the innovation process emerge. Studies are carried on that show the different 
implications between organizational structure and innovation.  
As consequence, a growing research interest on the better organizational modes for value 
creation in this field, is the result. 
 
If distinctive governance modes may arise, a new assessment for the innovation process occur, 
very different from that of Schumpeterian view. In other words, these approach suggest to 
address much attention from the problems occurring in term of  
1) division of labor in R&D process/firm boundaries, 
2) toward the different problem of organization (internal formal structure, internal 
informal structure, external linkages) and to a more deep analysis of  
3) strategic management” (Teece, 1999).      
 
This research approach states the critical importance of the link between the innovative 
potential and the organizational structure. The current research need goes toward a more deep 
comprehension of this relation by discussing the above mentioned  implications (see points 1, 2 
and 3). The emerging, richer framework of the innovation process pay greater attention to 
organizational structure, both formal and informal and to recognize the importance of market 
structure and the business environment (see figure 3). 
 
Among the various organizational structures that are investigated, as the main referred, the 
case of the individual inventor and/or the stand-alone laboratory is to consider with more 
attention for our analysis. In fact, as we have said and hopefully will discuss in this text, the 
changing process that was introduced with biotechnologies has impacted strongly on the theory 
of the innovation. The brand of this technological breakthrough may be expressed in terms of 
the new possibilities for scientists to become entrepreneurs.  
When this “marketable basic research” emerged, many problems for the inventor-entrepreneur 
also raised. These problems refer, basically, to patent assessment and to the concomitant 
leakage problems which this process exposes. In particular, when an inventor (or an enterprise) 
can rely on the instruments of intellectual property protection to protect invention from 
imitation, we know that the inventor can appropriate a substantial portion of the inventor’s 
market value. When property rights are weak (the normal case), the inventors’ ability to capture 
value are dramatically circumvented (Teece, 1986). In the case where the individual inventor 
has a patent but little else, then the patent-holder’s options include: a) licensing the technology 
to incumbent firms who already have the necessary complementary assets in place; b) using the 
patent as collateral to raise debt funds to help develop an organization to exploit the 
technology; c) exchanging the patent for equity in a start-up, equity funded firm; d) exchanging 
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Source: Teece, 1999 
 
 
In parallel, we know that none of these options avoid the problem of valuing the patent in itself 
and the Arrow paradox is verified. Or, in Arrow’ words: “Its value for the purchaser is not known 
until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost” (Arrow, 1974. 
pg. 152). While this problem is somewhat softened where there is good patent protection, most 
nonindustrial providers of funds are going to need technical experts to evaluate the technology, 
in which case the risk of leakage remains (Teece, 1999). Of course, if the problem involve an 
organization (a stand alone laboratory) instead of the individual inventor, or, if scale economies 
exist in R&D, different organizational skills may help to face the knowledge transition.  
 
These argumentations let us consider that the current doctrinal paradigms that face these kind 
of problems, may be (basically) distinguished in two great research approach. They differ, in 
primis, in the mode of viewing the innovation process.    
If we consider that ideas come from University or research center laboratories and that the firm 
represents the transition from basic to applied research where products are developed, this 
may illustrates the difference in role between non-profit research centers (where basic research 


























developmental research is conducted), often funded by investors (Narin et al., 1997) 24. In R&D, 
the firm often acquires scientific knowledge from an academic sector, procures certain services 
from specialist firms, and forms an alliance with another firm(s) who has a different capability.  
The capability theory explains this behavior. Transaction costs may arise in the use of outside 
resources.  
Under these premises,  research contributions (Odagiri, 2003) sustain the importance to refer to 
both theories, in the need to consider them not-mutually-exclusive on these issues: economies 
of scale and scope, transaction costs and capabilities are the three major determinants of the 
boundary of the firm, that is, of the boundary separating in-house R&D and procured R&D. 
By the other hand, if we consider that ideas may arise in a place not-pre-determined but that  
may arise or converge in a relational  interaction (often of informal nature) among different 
actors (co-specialization – assets to be employed in conjunction) , we have to turn our attention 
to the mode of capturing these ideas.   
Here, the fundamental research question is no longer to investigate  “who makes what”,  as to 
determine HOW the actors could strategically move between basic and applied research in a 
shared value creation process.  
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 Under this hypothesis the research focus on inter-industry differences in the relationship between university and 
industry. A line of research pioneered by Francis Narin and colleagues exploits information on references to 
scientific articles contained in patent documents, which shows an increasing reliance of private technology on 
public science (Narin and Noma 1985; Narin et al. 1997; McMillan et al. 2000; Hicks et al. 2001; Tijssen 2001; 
Branstetter and Ogura 2005). A related line of enquiry investigates the patterns of scientific paper co-authorship 
among academic and corporate scientists, and provides evidence of increasing levels of collaboration across 
organisational boundaries (Hicks 1995; Calvert and Patel 2003; Tijssen 2004). Many observers have raised concerns 
about the potentially negative effects of the commercialisation of scientific discoveries for the conduct of academic 
research. It has been argued that the financial incentives from patenting and licensing could shift the orientation of 
scientists away from basic and towards applied research and could undermine their commitment to the norms of 
open science, thereby leading to secrecy and publication delays. In order to address these issues, many scholars 
have begun to compile large data sets matching inventor names with scientific author names, and to collect data 
on individual researchers’ patenting and publication performance (Azagra-Caro et al. 2006; Azoulay et al. 2006; Van 
Looy et al. 2006; Breschi et al. 2007, 2008; Calderini et al. 2007; Fabrizio and Minin 2008). Although no consensus 
has been reached, there is evidence that there is no apparent trade-off between patenting and either quantity or 
quality of research output. Not only do scientists with better patenting performance tend to exhibit superior 
publication scores with no decrease in the quality of output, but also the most productive scientists are those most 
likely to become inventors. A related stream of research focuses on the role of individual scientists in relation to 
knowledge spillovers from academic research and knowledge transfer from university to industry more broadly. 
The need for a better understanding of the mechanisms of knowledge flows has sparked several attempts to trace 
personal links between academic researchers and private firms. In this context, Cockburn and Henderson (1998) 
argue that the extent of connectedness to the community of open science is a key factor explaining the ability of 
firms to tap into scientific developments. Establishing linkages with the community of open science may crucially 
affect their capacity to recognise and effectively exploit upstream developments in basic research. Using 
qualitative information and data on scientific co-authorship, Cockburn and Henderson show that firms strive to 
develop this capacity by recruiting and rewarding researchers based on their ranking in the hierarchy of public-
sector science and their ability to engage with the academic community. Finally, we believe that this approach may 
analyze only a portion of a wider phenomenon. If the problem is in reinforcing the whole innovation process 
(starting from basic to applied research), and if technology is in part tacit and unappropriable,  there will be a need 
of a multiple and complex kind of relationality among the actors involved. It may express in various forms of 
connectedness and not only in the sharing of publications. This is well explained by Teece (1999) (see our text, note 




Scholars of the Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) view extended RBV to dynamic markets (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007). These researchers doubt that the mere existence of 
appropriate bundles of specific resources is insufficient to sustain competitive advantage in 
situations involving rapid and unpredictable market change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Teece et al., 1997). Consequently, these researchers argue that dynamic capability, or the ability 
to integrate, build and reconfigure resources, is essential in learning competitive advantage 
under circumstances of environmental volatility (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Newbert, 2005; 
Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
In this conceptual transition (from RBV to DCs) there is the theoretical core issue for our 
analysis. Subsequently, in what follows we’ll try to summarize the principal statements of both 
these two theoretical framework.  
 
 
2.2 DCs’ theoretical framework: main statements 
The RBV theorize that firms possessing resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non 
substitutable (i.e. resources with VRIN attributes) can achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage by implementing fresh value-creating strategies that are difficult for competitors to 
duplicate (Barney, 1986;  Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Grant, 1991; Newbert, 2007; Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2006; Wernerfelt, 1984).  The RBV has become a crucial logical consideration in firm strategy 
development. Consequently, accumulating resources to foster competitive advantage or 
economic rent has become fundamental to strategic thinking for numerous managers and 
scholars.  
The pioneristic work of Penrose (1959) introduced the importance of viewing the firm as a 
collection of physical and human resources. These resources had to be accumulated by the firm 
to achieve growth. The competitive advantage, in other words, is captured through an 
entrepreneurial rent stemming from fundamental firm-level efficiency advantages. Many 
similarities are with Schumpeter (and to his fundamental definition of the competitive context), 
with his view on the role of innovation as source of competitive advantage. The central 
conceptual contribution is given by the consideration that resources are valuable only when 
they constitute capabilities  which have to be enhanced through innovation and learning for the 
firm to grow.   
From this perspective the process of identifying and developing the requisite assets is not 
particularly problematic. The process involves nothing more than choosing rationally among a 
well-defined set of investment alternatives. If assets are not already owned, they can be 
bought.  
For our analytical purposes we point out, briefly,  the RBV’s entry decision process in the 
following phases: 
 
a. Identify the firm’s unique resources; 
b. Decide in which markets those resources can earn the highest rents; 
c. Decide whether the rents from those assets are most effectively utilized by  
α)integrating into related markets, β)selling the relevant intermediate output to related 
firms, or γ)selling the assets themselves to a firm in related businesses. 
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The RBV also point out the role of skill acquisition, the management of knowledge and know-
how and learning as fundamental  strategic issues when control over scarce resources is the 
source of economic profits. 
In integrating the above mentioned framework25, DCs view introduces, and emphasizes, the two 
key aspects of the dynamism and a more deeper analysis of organizational capabilities. 
In particular, with the term dynamic they refer to the capacity to renew  the competences so as 
to achieve congruence with the changing business environment. The term capabilities 
emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and 
reconfiguring internal and organizational skills, resources, and functional competences to match 
the requirements of a changing environment. 
“There are many dimensions of the business firm that must be understood if one is to grasp 
firm-level distinctive competences/capabilities. In this paper we merely identify several classes 
of factors that will help determine a firm’s distinctive competence and dynamic capabilities. We 
organize these in three categories: processes, positions and paths. The essence of competences 
and capabilities is embedded in organizational processes of one kind or another. But the 
content of these processes and the opportunities they afford for developing competitive 
advantage at any point in time are shaped significantly by the assets the firm possesses (internal 
and market) and by the evolutionary path it has adopted/inherited. Hence organizational 
processes, shaped by the firm’s asset positions and modeled by its evolutionary and co-
evolutionary paths, explain the essence of the firm’s dynamic capabilities and its competitive 
advantage” (Teece, et al., 1997. Pg. 518). 
Than, competence can provide competitive advantage and generate rents only if they are based 
on a collection of routines, skills, and complementary assets that are difficult to imitate.  
In addition, posed the endogenous role of industrial structure, the framework states the 
priorities in the entry decision process in the following phases: 
 
a. Capture the emerging marketplace trajectories; 
b. Address it through new products, processes or services; 
c. Managing threats and Reconfiguration 
As consequence, the deep difference with the RBV is in the firm value definition: it is 
guaranteed not only by the firm’s Unique Asset Base (UAB) but also by Dynamic Capabilities 
(DCs).  
                                                 
25
 Like RBV, the DCs approach is centrally concerned to wealth creation and capture (Teece, Pisano, Schuen, 1997). 
Its disciplinary foundation is evolutionary economics (Nelson, Winter, 1982). For this reason, it brings a process 
(dynamic) perspective to its firm conceptualization. More precisely, the DCs’ theory of the firm  is very consistent 
with Coase (1937) (to his firm definition as an alternative to market in the mode of governance) but not with the 
transaction costs (TCE)  literature, greatly expanded by Williamson (1975; 1985). The main differences with TCE 
lying in the explanation of the selection of what organize internally or externally. While TCE main argumentation is 
the nontradability of specific assets, DCs look at assets co-specialization as the reason why assets are not traded. 
Here the focus is on the “orchestration” of co-specialized assets by strategic managers. The deep difference 
emerges then at methodological level: while TCE emphasized opportunistic free riding and a human actor 
boundedly rational, self-interest seeking, opportunistic, and full of guile, DCs adds other traits of human nature: 
intrapreneurship and entrepreneurship and foresight and acumen (Helfat et al., 2007). Operationally, it means that 
DCs data sources and methods are inductive theoretical tools, qualitative data, qualitative empirical analysis. 
 27
So the DC view point out the role of dynamic capabilities, mainly grouped in the above cited a, 
b, c behavioral dimensions, as the foundation of enterprise-level competitive advantage in 
regimes of rapid technological change. 
Together (a, b and c)  might  be thought  of as asset “orchestration” processes.  
 
“A key strategic function  of management is to find new value-enhancing combinations inside 
the enterprise, and between and amongst  enterprises, and with supporting institutions 
external to the enterprise. Because many of the most valuable assets inside the firm are 
knowledge related and hence non-tradable, the coordination and integration of such assets 
create value that cannot be replicated in a market” (Teece, 2007. Pg. 1341). 
Unfortunately, most DC research focuses solely on conceptual discussions (e.g. Deeds et al., 
2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Griffith and Harvey, 2001; Helfat et al., 2007; King and 
Tucci, 2002; Luo, 2000; Madhok and Osegowitsch, 2000; Majumdar, 2000; Makadok, 2001; 
Petroni, 1998; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 
2002), and empirical studies are rare (e.g. Wu, 2006; 2007). Numerous concepts need 
examination and DC needs further discussion.  
An open problem is represented by the priorities to attribute to each resource in discriminating 
competitive advantages.  
The field of strategic management and dynamic capabilities framework recognize that “strategic 
fit” needs to be continuously achieved. The key dimension of fit emphasized in the DCs 
framework is that of cospecialization.  
“Cospecialized assets are a particular class of complementary assets where the value of an asset 
is a function of its use in conjunction with other particular assets. With cospecialization, joint 
use is value enhancing” (Teece, 2007. pg. 1338).  
A wide scientific debate emerges from the discussion about the nature of this kind of relation 
(cospecialization). Many research efforts has been dedicated to model the  relationship 
between cospecialized and complementary assets. In particular, Lippman and Rumelt (1982) 
gave the first definition of causal ambiguity26 to pose a problem of comprehension of logical-
causal connections between actions and results. The problem involved both the intra-firm and 
inter-organization relations.  They also proposed (Lippman, Rumelt, 2003a; 2003b) the concept 
of supermodularity to bring in the tools of cooperative game theory.  
Teece (2007) suggests to consider the case of complete cospecialization as a special case of 
economies of scope, “where not only are complementary assets more valuable in joint use than 
in separate use, but they may, in fact, have zero value in separate use and high value in joint 
use. Cospecialization may stem from economies of scope, but they could also stem from the 
revenue enhancement associated with producing a bundled or integrated solution for the 
customer” (Teece, 2007. pg 1338). 
Some suggest that DCs are actually simple and causal links between the resource or capability 
and the rent creation may be easy to establish (Eisenhardt, Martin, 2000). 
Other research contributions overcome the problem by adopting an inductive methodological 
approach in which it is possible to observe directly the frequency of a specific behaviour.   
                                                 
26
 On this regard, we remember that the concept was used in the analysis of competition with respect to uncertain 
imitability (Lippman, Rumelt, 1982). Following this analysis, the ambiguity exists in the nature of basic assets and in 
the modes of interaction among them. This ambiguity may conduce to the impossibility in finding a value creation 
algorithm. More recent research (Blyler, Coff, 2003), addressed to benefits and rent allocation stemming from DCs, 
underline the importance of causal ambiguity contexts.    
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An interesting contribution on this issue is given by Fujimoto (1999). He faced firm evolutionary 
capabilities using the car industry in general, and Toyota in particular, as an example. “He 
extends the resource view of the firm to look in detail at how capabilities change over time, 
attempting to explain interregional and interfirm differences. Instead of applying the concepts 
of resource-based or capability theories on the firm as a unit, Fujimoto brings the analysis to the 
operational level. This approach has merit  in that it serves to make the rather abstract notion 
of capabilities of the firm much more concrete. In the process, Fujimoto makes a compelling 
argument for not only interpreting capabilities as something directly affecting the level of 
competitive performance and the improvements of performance, but also as the accumulation 
of these static and improvement capabilities. In other words, successful firms are not only 
competitive and know how to improve to stay competitive, they also know how to sustain these 
skills over time; a concept not too dissimilar in spirit from double-loop learning or “learning how 
to learn”. His work goes on to explore in some depth this novel interpretation of evolutionary 
capability as a firm-specific ability to acquire both static and improvement capabilities” 
(Hagström, Chandler, 1999. pg.3). 
On the field of operational determination of DCs, more recent literature (Helfat et al., 2007) 
have identified four important influences on the evolutionary fitness of dynamic capabilities: 
quality, cost, market demand, and competition. These works introduce the term “technical 
fitness” to capture the idea of quality per unit of cost, an internal measure of capability 
performance. The other two factors of market demand and competition capture important 
environmental influences on evolutionary fitness. Each of these factors affects the external fit of 
operational abilities as well as the evolutionary fitness of dynamic capabilities. 
 
 
2.3 The research process  
We conducted an exploratory study using a qualitative approach based on case studies.  
Consequently, we undertook an in-depth case study analysis of a limited number (four) of 
successful biotech research-based organizations conducting a participant observation through 
direct visits  over a period of two years.  
Documentary data (emerging from both their institutional memoranda, reports and official web 
sites) in conjunction with group interviews and observations have been our data sources.    
The target was to obtain the information needed to built the comprehension of firm value 
creation process. 
The following pages (grouped in chapter 2 and 3) will show the research process in both its 
alternating phases of data collection and analysis until the definition of our operational 
definition of firm value27.  
 
The research process  starts out from a general research question and leads to a new 
theoretical insight in the field of network governance by alternating the phases of collection and 
data analysis. Two basic research phases can be distinguished:   
 
• Open coding: guided by initial research questions (“how to address basic research 
supply in southern Italy?”), we collected the first set of data, and then analyzed the 
evidence. Here, our attention was on identifying the “positive experience” of a good 
                                                 
27
The research process is very close to that of  Grounded Theory of Strauss and Corbin (1998).  
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relationship between basic and applied research in the field of biotechnology.  In this 
first phase we also look at the potential organizational fields in which we can 
observe and codify informal relations. We also started to use Social Network Analysis 
(SNA).  
• Selective coding:  the second set of data was collected after the first phase of data 
analysis. Here, we were guided by theoretical developments that had emerged 
during the analysis.  We then tested for the presence of Relational and Integrative 
capabilities (R&ICs) in our case studies.  
 
 
The specific research question arose from the dynamic capability (DC) theoretical model (Teece, 
Pisano, Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007) and concerns the way in which research organizations 
recognize and apply Relational and Integrative Capabilities (R&ICs) (the most important dynamic 
capabilities in the biotechnology field) for value. 
The following sections will focus on the presentation of our derived research logic. 
As the DC theoretical framework has been chosen to study firm value and a relational analysis 
to explore the organization, we will consider the following: in section 2.4.1, the adequacy of DC 
theory to study our firms; in section 2.4.3, previous research that has supported us when 
considering R&ICs as the dominant expression of DC at firm-level.   A short review of informal 
relations as well as the critical organizational dimension to undergird the empirical relational 
analysis, will be grouped in Chapter 3. 
 
Findings, grouped in chapter 4, will be presented through a discussion on three key issues. 
They will consist of a sum of evidence and theoretical assumptions that lead to the formulation 
of some logical propositions. 
The conclusions, in the same chapter, will be expressed on two levels: 
a) on regard of the specific research question,  we can accept or refuse the implications of 
the theoretical framework; 
b) on regard of general research target, we can give some policy addresses.  
 
 
2.4 The construction of the derived research logic  
 
2.4.1. DCs perspective to study biotech firms’ value creation process 
The early researches in biotech University-Industry complex world  showed the emerging 
biotech industry as a real strength of USA economic system (Kenney, 1986). The new industry28 
was composed of the small scientific-entrepreneurial labs, very fragile during their first start-up 
phases, and much dependent from both the public and private financing (venture capital and 
stock exchange). In addition, the role of the state29 was considered very crucial and was lying 
from the regulation until  research funding.  
                                                 
28
 The US economic system may be considered the birthplace of biotechnological industry. On the birth pattern of 
this industry there may be country-specific factors in action (see Passaro, Vittoria, 1996a,b; Bartholomew, 1997). A 
specific analysis of the birth modes of biotech Italian firms is in Passaro, Vittoria, 2000. 
29
 “The entire history of molecular biology is that of public funding of basic research that was meant to create the 
technical base necessary to understand and cure diseases….no corporation or group of corporations could have 
undertaken the research effort necessary to provide the knowledge base to create an industry. The uncertainty of 
payoff and long investment lead times were prohibitive. …Another crucial role for the state is that of validating new 
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Since biotechnology was born in the laboratories of American research universities the classical 
model describing the relation between basic and applied research as unidirectional direction 
was changing. University biology departments have been disrupted as great numbers of 
biologists have become entrepreneurs or at least deeply involved in commercial affairs. The 
creation of biotechnology industry was in large part due to the critical role of university 
professors. So the biotech innovation process may be viewed as a process that maintain the 
linearity of sequences from basic to applied research while the real change concerned the 
emerging role of basic research actors (see figure 4 below). 
 
 

















According to Kenney (1986), one of the most meaningful modes of creation of the new biotech 
firms (NBFs) was through the spin-off from academia of scientists who, following their 
professional experience, decided to create their own enterprise. The new firm, started on a 
research idea/project, was initially strictly dependent from external financial sources.  
So, during that period, the real problem was to establish whether biotechnology would have 
survived as an industry as opposed to being merely a new tool in traditional industries (giant 
chemical and pharmaceutical companies more able to absorb the biotech start-ups). In effect, 
under country specific conditions, the strategic alliances (especially between the small biotech 
start-ups and large firms)  increased very fast.  
Transaction cost scholars (Williamson 1975; 1985) contended that alliances in this field was 
inherently transitory. They sustained that these alliances necessitated by a period of 
technological upheaval but soon to be replaced by (vertical) integration30.  
What will be important to move the attention of research community toward the more wide 
application of RBV on these issues, were the numerous articles dedicated to the explanation of 
                                                                                                                                                              
areas of natural world as private property.  (through the patent system) it permitted the patenting of a living 
organism sui generis, that is, it need not be part of a process” (Kenney, 1986. pg. 241-242).  
30
 Their arguments varied from:  the inevitable information asymmetries associated with knowledge-intensive 
sectors (Arrow, 1973);  ex ante small numbers bargaining conditions; the tacitness of some knowledge components 
(Pisano, 1991); general uncertainty over intellectual property rights (Pisano, 1990); specific industry legislation 
(Pisano, 1991).  
U  F 
 NBF scientist 
Legend: 
U = University 
F= Firm 
NBF = new biotech firm 
 
Source: our elaboration 
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alliance formation in a different number of high-tech industries (like semiconductors).  The 
underlying logic of alliance formation became, thus, for these industries, strategic needs and 
social opportunities (Eisenhardt, Schoonhoven, 1996) 31. 
Subsequent research efforts were made in organizational science that were important to 
explore more deeply the alliance phenomenon in the biotech field (see Nohria, Eccles, 1992). 
Two important solicitations emerged from this wave of research: the observation of the 
quantitative increase in the number of biotech strategic alliances also in the international 
scenario (Barley, Freeman, Hybels, 1992) and the fundamental learning need at the base of the 
reason d’etre of some stable biotech networks (Powell, Brantley, 1992).   
These researches have played the important function of recognizing the network as the 
organizational structure for biotechnologies and, more, they have established that alliances 
between NBFs and large manufacturing firms as the alternative solution to their financial 
recurring problem.   
“After years of dependence on venture capital and public financing, the managers of dedicated 
biotech firms increasingly have turned to formal cooperative relationships for their vital 
resources. Many such relationships are with the leading firms in their own markets. As a result, 
networks of inter-organizational alliances have become integral to the structure of the biotech 
community. …Strategic alliances in biotechnology generally involve the exchange of knowledge 
for money. Often the exchange requires a smaller firm to sacrifice some degree of autonomy 
(for instance, over determining its goals for R&D) to gain access to markets with high barriers to 
entry. For many biotechnology firms, the compromise may forestall bankruptcy, merger, or 
acquisition.” (Barley, Freeman, Hybels, 1992. Pg. 343-44)32.  
With the analysis of Powell and Brantley (1992), a key concern was whether one type of 
external linkage is a substitute for another type of linkage or complementary to it.  They started 
to consider new biotech firms (NBF)33 and the case in which, faced with competition from large, 
                                                 
31
 Consistent with these explanations, it was found that alliances form when firms are in vulnerable strategic 
positions either because they are competing in emergent or highly competitive industries or because they are 
attempting pioneering technical strategies. It was also found that alliances form when firms are in strong social 
positions such that they are led by large, experienced, and well-connected top management teams. 
32 Similarly, these researchers acknowledge some issues as open problems of the emerging business, for example: 
on the competitive level, they raise the question on how will endure the USA leadership on the international 
market. And, specifically, on what will be the ultimate effects of a large scale transfer of technical knowledge to the 
industries of competing nations. 
This same literature expresses the need to ensure more analysis on the conditions under which alliances are 
negotiated, and, on what benefits parties expect to receive, and what the perceived costs and pitfalls of such 
relationships may be. 
33
The research include in this category “NBFs on the basis of the primary market that the company serves. The four 
main market segments that NBFs are found include diagnostics, therapeutics, agriculture and instrumentation and 
supply. Three other very small segments- specialty chemicals, bioremediation (environmental cleanup) and animal 
health care – are in very early stages of development. We decided not to include NBFs in instrumentation and 
supply because their focus on developing research instruments, reagents, and the like makes these firms very 
distinctive. They are less involved in R&D, do not face costly and complex clinical trials, and do not have close ties to 
universities. These are companies that focus on plant genetics and the development of microbial pesticides and 
herbicides. In part because of public opposition and regulatory controls, research in this area is still in its infancy. 
The regulatory environment for ag-bio is fundamentally different from that of therapeutics and diagnostics. In the 
latter cases, the risks are ultimately to a single individual who chooses to take a drug or a test, and the benefits are 
very clear. With ag-bio, the risks are collective. There are possible harmful externalities and the benefits are less 
obvious. Our focus is on the most R&D intensive sectors, where NBF development has been the most pronounced. 
The human therapeutic market is the most research intensive segment of the industry and the one for which the 
greatest promise is held. Therapeutic products address a wide range of diseases and conditions involving the blood 
system, the immune system, and hormonal balances. These products, which provide therapeutic alternatives where 
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well endowed pharmaceutical companies, these firms would pursue a specialist strategy 
wherein they attempt to exploit a specific market segment. In this situation it is possible (or 
expected) that they would pursued a limited number of agreements with only those partners 
that contribute to this specialist approach. In other words, if NBF chose to internalize various 
stages of the production process and resort to external ties only when their internal capability is 
lacking, a transaction cost argument would contended that over time, successful NBFs would 
rely less and less on outside parties. Instead, in these authors’ perspective, NBFs are more 
nearly to attempt to both develop in-house capabilities and promote external collaboration. 
External ties should be viewed as complementary; that is, one agreement would serve  as a 
means to enhance a configuration of skills and products that a firm is developing. “In a very 
simple terms, imagine that firm A faces a choice of forming an agreement with partner X to 
pursue a research collaboration, or with partner Y to market a new diagnostic test. If 
agreements are viewed as substitutes for one another, than the firm would chose only one 
partner. The choice itself presumably would be dictated by the strategic logic of either 
specialization or internal integration. In contrast, if agreements are viewed as complementary, 
then firm A would pursue both agreements, following a strategy that suggests that the gains 
from one agreement might augment the gains from another” (Powell, Brantley. Op.cit. pg. 391). 
On this fundamental motivation, there is the explanation of the permanence of collaboration 
and of the network configuration of most R&D actors in biotech field.  
Here enclosed we can observe one kind of actors involved in a biotech networks (tab. 3) and a 
taxonomy of the type of relationship (tab. 3a) used in the above mentioned contribution of 
Barley, Freeman and Hybels (1992). 
 
 
Table 3: Types of organizations involved in the U.S. Biotechnology Community 







Supplier of goods 
Supplier of services 




Not otherwise classified 
Source: Barley, Freeman and Hybels (1992). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
none previously existed or that are superior to existing ones, faces a lengthy and costly process of clinical trials to 
meet government standards for efficacy and safety. The diagnostic field consists of products used to detect diseases 
conditions  (AIDS, cancer), physiological states (pregnancy), or genetic abnormalities. These diagnostic tests are of 
two types- in vivo and in vitro. In vitro tests are performed in laboratories, usually with blood samples. Because they 
are used outside the body, in vitro tests are not subject to stringent regulatory review. The subsequently lower costs 
of development have led to rapid growth in this area. In vivo diagnostics are done in the body itself and basically 
involve the use of imaging agents. These tests are subject to the same regulatory process as therapeutic products” 
















Source: Barley, Freeman and Hybels (1992). 
 
 
The research of Powell and Brantley (1992), focused entirely on formal agreements, through 
some statistical description gives an insight into what kinds of firms are most likely to be 
involved in multiple formal arrangements. They use the Bioscan directory (an independent 
industrial reporting service) which lists more than 900 organizations, commercial, no profit, U.S. 
and international, dedicated biotech firms as well as diversified chemical and pharmaceutical 
corporations. Their focus is on the NBF. This firm, already known as a private lab, targeted to 
supply research services,  are picked up only if generally independently owned and not in a 
stable subsidiary of a larger company.   
The same authors underline the nature of research results uniquely focused on formal 
arrangements. They already advert the need to explore in a future research the important role 
of informal relations or in the relations that underlie the traffic back and forth between 
universities and NBFs. As first step in this direction they collect information on the science 
advisory boards for the firms in their sample. Where the initial interviews with scientists who 
are extensively involved in these consulting relationships suggest that formal agreements 
among universities, research institutes, and NBFs evolve out of preexisting educational and 
work-related ties (see figure 5 below). 
 
 











Source: our elaboration 
 
U  F 
 NBF scientist 
Legend: 
U = University 
F= Firm 
NBF = new biotech firm 
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These contributions, then, begins to open a fundamental debate on the definition and 
characteristics of the network (length, shape of ties, etc.) in this field, but also in terms of 
strategic priorities: if the production/value depends on the access to knowledge and this access 
is secured by a dense network of formal and informal nature, the critical point of attention is, 
no longer – or not only - a problem of “finance”, but it becomes the result of a previous internal 
organizational (and strategic) capacity to establish and ensure access to these networks. 
In particular, focusing on (biotech) research network, is, now, more difficult to pick exclusively 
“basic research actors” so as “applied research actors” but more probably an NBF with a 
multiple portfolio of research project each at a different evolutionary stage between knowledge 
creation and knowledge capture practices or an academic department in which different 
research project are encouraged and differently targeted or even large firms whose employee 
works in a close scientific relation with external researchers. Each one of these actors could 
strategically move between basic and applied research in a shared value creation process. 
For each one of these actors the search for competitive advantage/value may be interpreted in 
terms of the search of the necessary capabilities and their external environment may be 
considered as an open economy with rapid innovation and globally dispersed sources of 
invention, innovation, and manufacturing capabilities. 
At this point, the research for a better functionality of innovation process in biotechnologies 
move toward the exploration of a) internal organizational capacity and b) to the external 
network that the same organization is able to built.  
The research questions is on what is, therefore, based the internal organizational capacity, and 
how the biotech actor/organization may built this organizational capacity. 
Selecting the DCs’ theoretical view to explore these issues means that “the fundamental 
economic problem (value creation in R&D) is solved by strategic managers” (Helfat et al., 2007. 
Pg. 19).  
As we have seen before (par. 2.2, note 25), DCs’ disciplinary foundation is economics. “What 
differentiates it is that it is based not on mainstream economics, but on evolutionary economics 
(Nelson, Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). Evolutionary economics is a behavioral approach to 
economics that is focused on routines, capabilities and change. Unlike most form of economics, 
it attends to process issues and other phenomena deep within organizational boundaries. Even 
so, as an economic theory it can at best tell only a part of the full story about dynamic 
capabilities. The concern of dynamic capabilities with such process issues as resource allocation, 
change management, and other mechanisms suggests the utility  of other disciplinary lenses  as 
well. Process scholars have developed models of these processes issues that draw on behavioral 
theories. For example March’s (1991) distinction between exploitation and exploration search 




2.4.2 The derived research logic 
A first step for the construction of the derived research logic is due by the selection of DCs’ 
approach to study both basic and applied research actors operating in biotech field. Each actor 
will be considered and individuated, in its value capturing endowment,  as composed by both a 
Unique Asset Base (UAB) and by Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) (see par. 2.2).  
So, to operationalize these two concepts, we propose the UAB (the mix of technical 
equipments, professional skills and know-how) as given by the specific firm assets. We will 
collect also the number of formal external arrangements of each actor observed. To individuate 
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firm’s DC (the firm’s organizational abilities to purposefully create, extend or modify the UAB) 
we propose a previous examination of the research contributions focused on the modes of 
organizing biotech innovation at network level (see par. 2.4.3). As we know (Helfat, et al. 2007), 
DCs are context dependent. And a first conceptual yardstick for measuring the performance of 
DCs is “evolutionary fitness”34. “Evolutionary fitness refers to how well a dynamic capability 
enables an organization to make a living by creating, extending, or modifying its resource base. 
The analogue to evolutionary fitness for operational capabilities is what as come to be called 
“external fit”. Evolutionary fitness depends on the external selection environment: 
evolutionarily fit dynamic capabilities enable a firm to survive and perhaps grow, and to prosper 
in the marketplace. Thus, the extent of evolutionary fitness depends on how well the dynamic 
capabilities of an organization match the context in which the organization operates” (Helfat, et 
al. 2007. Pg. 7). 
    
Our research will explore four case studies. Each will be represented by a success biotech 
research organization located in southern Italy. Each organization will be studied for what it 
have already put in action to reach a success position. In the need to understand which part of 
the organization may represent the UAB and the DCs. By posing V as value35/success, we will try 
to interpret/operationalize for each organization the following expression: 
 
V = UAB + DCs36  
 
In other words, if we assume that each organization rely on a network of possible partners and 
that they operate in an open innovative environment, we will have to provide a framework such 










                                                 
34
 “The population ecology literature has used the term “fitness” with reference to the ability of an organization to 
survive in the face of Darwinian-like selection by the external environment (see e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Winter (2003) uses the term “ecological fitness” to incorporate the impact on organizational survival (including net 
reproduction or growth rates) not only of the technical fitness of an entire organization, but also the technical 
fitness of individual attributes (e.g., capabilities) of organizations” (Helfat et al., 2007. Pg. 7). 
35
 Although we are not interested in performance measures for this analysis (as we have selected only success 
cases) we have to remember that in this framework an economic logic underlies the most commonly used 
conceptual measures of firm performance: i. e. value creation (willingness to pay minus cost), competitive 
advantage (relative value creation) and sustained competitive advantage. More probably a wider definition of firm 
value is needed when network governance and incentive issues are discussed. Here, the network value is the 
concept that emerges and operates as a behavioral driver. The problem may newly emerges in this research when a 
common organizational solution has been founded for both profit and no-profit agents.   
36
 The + symbol serves to indicate the same relation of complementarity between the two groups of resources  
indicated by the DCs theoretical framework. We also assume these DCs as critical to the organization’s 
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2.4.3 DCs as R&ICs for research-based BFs  
Even if today it is more and more difficult to select a unique basic-research actor and/or a 
unique applied research actor in a biotech network, the link between the two phases of the 
research/innovation process remain highly critic in BF’s value generation.  The two processes 
can be  related to actions rather than to a single actor and can be represented by the 
knowledge-creation activity and to a distinct capacity to capture new ideas or, more, to develop 
and implement these new ideas on a large-scale production process.  
Some prior studies, conducted mainly for the USA,  have focused on the modes of organizing 
biotech innovation by highlighting the substantial network domain (Powell, Brantley, 1992; 
Powell, Koput, Smith-Doerr, 1996; Powell, 1996; Powell, 1998; Kogut, 2000; Powell, White, 
Koput, Owen-Smith, 2005).  
The structural features of networks (e.g. their density, scope, strength of ties) linking public 
research organizations (PROs) to commercial firms have been subjected to a good deal of 
analysis (Powell et al., 1996; Owen-Smith et al., 2002). In the field of biomedical innovation, for 
example, the critical role of relational and integrative capabilities for the entire innovation 
system has been described (Owen-Smith et al., 2002). It refers respectively to the ability of 
scientists to move back and forth between basic science and clinical development, and to the 
ability of organizations within an innovation system to collaborate with other diverse 
U  F 





Open economy = 
Rapid innovation and globally 
dispersed sources of invention, 
innovation and manufacturing 
capabilities 
Hospital 
V = UAB + DCs 
Legend:  
U = University 
F = Firm 
NBF = new biotech firm 
V = firm Value 
UAB = unique asset base 
DCs = dynamic capabilities 
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organizations. In keeping with “national innovation system” approaches, the research suggests 
that these capabilities stem from macro-level institutional differences in the structure and 
operation of networks and, thus, differ across nations (Carlsson, 2002; Nelson, 1993). In 
particular, Owen-Smith et al (2002), through an analysis of upstream R&D linkages, have 
demonstrated that these capabilities are better developed in the US institutional context than 
in Europe. This, they suggest, accounts (at least in part) for the US national advantage in 
biomedical innovation. 
As yet, however, relatively little research has focused on identifying the ways in which such 
macro capabilities are recognized and applied at firm-level. Thus, whilst there is now evidence 
linking macro data on networks to quantitative indicators of innovation (e.g. the development 
of patents or the diffusion of innovations), there is also scope for qualitative research to 
complement this by investigating the process through which macro-level capabilities play out in 
the experiences of single firm and its specific value creation process. For example, how might 
the ability of scientists to move back and forth between basic science and product development 
(i.e. integrative capabilities) facilitate the value creation process in a particular BF’s 
organizational setting? 
With regard to relational capabilities, there is ample evidence that individual firms, even large 
pharma, do not possess all of the resources necessary to successfully develop new therapeutics 
(Powell et al., 1996). Individuals and firms, therefore, need to collaborate formally and 
informally to acquire the necessary resources. In the biotechnology sector, “open” channels 
have been found to be particularly helpful in facilitating opportunities for knowledge creation 
through the enhanced likelihood of “spillover effects”: that is, knowledge is more likely to “leak” 
though more open channels (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Murray, 2002; Kreiner and Schultz, 
1993). Similarly, Salman and Saives (2005) show that, as well as being influenced by direct 
relationships between organizations, innovation outcomes are attributable to informal, 
unpredictable relationships generated through indirect ties, which create access to expertise 
beyond formal alliance partnerships. Other literature has emphasized the importance of trust-
based, informal networks for R&D (e.g. Liebeskind et al. 1996; Kreiner and Shultz, 1993). 
This prior research is indicative of the ways in which relational and integrative capabilities 
(R&ICs) might influence innovation processes in broad terms. For example, it suggests that one 
important mechanism via which integrative capabilities could influence innovation at project 
level is through the career identities and values of individual scientists involved in project work, 
in particular the extent to which they see goals of science and commerce as mutually 
acceptable. Similarly, relational capabilities at the macro level (as indicated in prior research by 
the density and scope of network ties within regions and nations) would appear to be related, 
at project level, to the ability of the organizations involved in innovation process to acquire and 
create relevant expertise, with informal networks being especially important in this respect. 
However, further research is needed to explore these mechanisms in detail37.  
 
 The above serves to build our derived research logic, summarized in figure 7.  
                                                 
37 The value of understanding relationships across different levels of analysis has also been observed by Gittel and 
Weiss (2004) who note that “frameworks for analyzing organizational phenomena must be responsive to the 
dynamic and complex characteristics and inter-relationships between multiple levels of analysis that “real life” 
situations reflect”. As already seen, an important aspect of these dynamics in the case of biomedical innovation 
concerns the ways in which networked relations and the combination of specialist forms of knowledge and 












V = value 
R&ICs = relational and integrative capabilities 
 
Source: our elaboration 
 
 
In other words, we can say that: if competitive advantage is reached when the 
firm/organization is endowed of both UAB and DCs, and if we consider the specific case of a 
research-based biotech organization (public or private), where value is generated by the  
effective transition from basic to applied research, than the organization itself can create value 
only when it is endowed of both UAB and R&ICs. 
Than: the specific research question will concern the analysis of the way in which biotech 
research-based organizations, located in southern Italy, recognize and apply the relational and 
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 We remember that the present research is addressed to explore the policy implications of a certain firm behavior. 
If it was addressed to explore the role of dynamic capabilities in the market competition we would have to set a 
measure of firm performance. In this case, we would also state that even if a dynamic capability creates high value, 
the firm may gain no real advantage if it creates no more value than other firms. 
 













CHAPTER 3  – ADDITIONAL RESEARCH/ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
 
 
In order to complete the set-up of research tools, it will be worth conducting a short review on 
informal relations and on the critical organizational dimensions involved.  
 
If a portion of firm value is provided by R&ICs, and if these abilities may be expressed via formal 
and informal relations, we need to analyze these conceptual categories in greater depth so as to 
construct a valid encoding paradigm for empirical analysis. 
 
With regard to formal ties, we can quite easily map the formal network emerging from the 
connections of the firm, such as research consortia, joint ventures, capital participation and 
subcontracting, that have been formally built up over a given period of time. All the formal 
contracts in which the firm declares to have engaged can then be collated and described, 
whereas additional guidelines are needed insofar as informal links are concerned.  
Going beyond the pioneer work of sociologists (Granovetter, 1973) whose definitions (in this 
case between strong and weak ties39) have proved to be useful, other problems regarding the 




3.1  Informal relations 
A good review of the research on this topic has been conducted by Powell and Grodal (2006). 
Their organizational approach and Powell’s previous research dedicated specifically to 
biotechnologies provide the necessary reference for our analysis. We quote the authors’ 
discussion directly with a view to adding our  own contribution in subsequent sections:  
“Informal patterns of affiliation have long been a central topic in sociology and anthropology, 
where studies of friendship networks, advice and referral networks, and communities are 
common. There is also a well-established strand of research in organization theory that points 
out how informal relations within organizations are often not closely aligned with formal 
authority (Dalton, 1959; Blau, 1963). A small line of work focuses on the impact of informal 
networks in large, multinational companies (Ghoshal, Bartlett, 1990; Hansen, 1999). Relatively 
                                                 
39 While there are many studies highlighting the role of formal relations on innovation (more dedicated to high-
tech industries), relatively few studies link informal ties to the innovation process. Commonly cited is the work of 
sociologists in which informal ties are considered as an acquaintance or a friendship,  or as a bond that stems from 
a common interest or affinity. 
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few studies, however, link informal ties to the innovation process, and there is scant research 
on informal inter-organizational relations. 
Scholars have often argued that the sharing of complex information is enhanced by embedded 
ties, which suggests that informal ties have the potential to make a significant contribution to 
innovation. There is a strong sense among researchers that informal relations undergird formal 
ties. Powell et al (1996) argue that, in the life sciences, “beneath most formal ties lie a sea of 
informal ties”. Nevertheless, many organizations are largely unaware of the extent to which 
formal activities are buttressed by informal connections (Cross, Borgatti, Parker, 2002).  
One of the key studies of informal networks among firms was Von Hippel's (1987) work on the 
sharing of proprietary information among US steel mini-mill producers. Based on interviews 
with plant managers and other engineers with direct knowledge on manufacturing processes, 
he found that the trading of proprietary knowledge with both cooperating and rival firms was 
commonplace. He was initially surprised that proprietary knowledge was so “leaky”, but he 
came to recognize that information exchange was highly reciprocal and conditioned on/by 
expectations that requests for help would be met. Much of the information that was shared 
focused on production problems, matters of pollution control and safety, and issues dealing 
with industry-wide concerns. But when relationships among engineers in rival firms were 
particularly close, more proprietary information was exchanged. Von Hippel also found that 
engineers had strong norms of membership in a professional community that cut across firms, 
and that information trading was a means to secure reputation and status in that community. 
He provides numerous examples of how the sharing of complex information by engineers 
contributed to the productivity of mini-mills. 
Likewise, the cluster of individuals that share a similar set of skills and expertise has been 
dubbed a “community of practice” (Wenger, 1998), or a “network of practice” (Brown, Duguid, 
2001). Similar in some respects to a technical community, or a sophisticated hobby club, these 
loose groups are engaged in related work practices, though they do not necessarily work 
together. Such fluid groups are important to the circulation of ideas. Saxenian (1994) observed 
ample sharing of proprietary knowledge among engineers in Silicon Valley, many of whom have 
as strong a commitment to their peers within the same occupational group as to their 
companies. Saxenian argues that informal knowledge sharing, widely institutionalized as a 
professional practice in Silicon Valley, is one of the crucial factors contributing to its fertile 
innovative climate. Cohen and Fields (1999) stress that professional ties in Silicon Valley are 
forged in complex collaborations between entrepreneurs, scientists, and associations, focused 
on the pursuit of innovation and its commercialization. This collaborative process generates and 
refines the intangible raw material of technical change-ideas. 
Kreiner and Shultz (1993) analyze the importance of informal ties through in-depth interviews 
with university researchers and industry  research directors in the Danish biotech field. They 
stress that successful collaborative R&D alliances within the Danish biotech industry are often 
based on informal ties. A barter economy, where materials, laboratory tests, chemicals, etc. are 
exchanged, was pervasive in this sector. They show that norms of sharing information on the 
frontier of research aid in the formation of more formal networks. As in the mini-mills, 
information exchange is not under managerial control, even though such reciprocal flows can 
be channeled by managerial actions. 
Many studies of informal relationships stress the significance of trust. Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) 
studied the association between intra-firm networks and innovation in fifteen business units of 
a multinational electronics company. They found, not surprisingly, that social ties led to a higher 
degree of trustworthiness among business units, which contributed to product innovation. The 
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importance of trust also looms large in Uzzi’s (1997) analysis of the difference between “arm’s-
length” ties (“a deal in which costs are everything”) and embedded ties (“you become friends 
with these people-business friends. You trust them and their work. They’re part of the family). 
Uzzi conducted interviews and ethnographic observations at twenty-three women’s better 
dress firms in the New York City apparel industry. His study is notable not only for the quality of 
his data, but also for his attention to the performance consequences of different kinds of 
different relations. Uzzi found that organizational performance increases with the use of 
embedded ties to network partners, as these ties were superior at conveying complex, context-
dependent knowledge. He argued, however, that a balance between a firm’s embedded ties 
and a firm’s arm’s-length ties needed to be struck, because a network structure comprising only 
arm’s-length ties or embedded ties decreased organizational performance” (Powell, Grodal, 
2006. Pg.70-72). 
We pose in table 4 the main codifications of informal relation modes emerging from the 
literature reviewed.  
 
 
Table 4: Informal relation modes (for value, innovation):   
               literature reviewing 
Von Hippel, 1987 Professional communities 
Wenger, 1998 Community of practices 
Brown, Duguid, 2001 Network of practices 
Powell, Grodal, 2006 Technical community; 
Fluid groups; 
Sophisticated hobby clubs 
Saxenian, 1994 Informal knowledge sharing 
Cohen, Fields, 1999 Professional ties 
Uzzi, 1997 Embedded ties 




3.2 Finding and fixing critical dimensions of potential informal networks in BFs 
Returning to our derived research logic,  we have, lastly, establish how to collect empirical data 
to interpret informal relations.  
For this analytical purpose, we can refer to the recent contributions of organization analysis.  
Using relational data, these research contributions have shown that the critical dimensions of 
“communication process” and “problem solving” (Cross, Parker, Sasson, 2003; Cross, Parker, 
2004) may constitute the two basic analytical areas wherein the most important informal 
linkages will be found.  
More, some research (Brown, Duguid, 2000; Cross, Baird, 2000; Dixon, 2000; VonKrogh et al., 
2000; Cohen, Prusak, 2001; Cross, Parker, Sasson, 2003) suggests that in today’s de-layered, 
knowledge-intensive settings, very common in biotech firms,  most work of importance is 
heavily reliant on informal networks sitting across core work processes. These informal links 
weave together new product development initiatives or integrating strategic initiatives such as 
alliances or mergers. They enable effective collaboration and integration of different expertise 
necessary for innovation. While such networks are generally not found on any formal 
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organizational charts, we will look for a range of actions considered at the base of effective 
collaboration. 
 
Finally, the complete “derived research logic” will appear as in the figure 8 below. 
 
 

















V = value 
R&ICs = relational and integrative capabilities 
 




3.3 Firms’ description, Data Collection and Data Analysis 
To complete the list of analytical tools we present the empirical part of the present study. 
We conducted a participant observation through direct visits over a period of two years. 
Matched pairs of firms operating in the field of biotechnological research located in southern 
Italy were selected in a way that they could be considered to operate under similar conditions 
and regulatory regimes but differed considerably with regard to ownership (whether profit or 
no-profit mission). We  consider them to be the most successful40 cases in southern Italy. 
In table 5 below, we synthetically show  the four cases, marked as A, B, C and D.  Cases B and C   
were paired since they are both non-profit organizations (a foundation and a public 
consortium), while cases A and D are two private organizations.   
The structural dimension (see fig. 9) of B and C is very similar in that they each possess 13-15 
research labs (see RL in figure 4) and 5-7 service facilities (see B in figure 9). In both cases, the 
Scientific Director (D) is the coordinator and founder of the center, the Staff Coordinator (SC) is 
responsible for daily management while the Administrative Director (C) is in charge of the 
center's administration. Case B, in addition, has a Scientific Office (A) that (i) assists the director 
                                                 
40  
Success is considered in terms of almost five years of business activity  with a substantial employment growth 




V = UAB + R&ICs 
 





in defining scientific strategies and policies (ii) produces key scientific documents for the center 
(iii) oversees the evaluation of the center and (iv) is responsible for the coordination and 
assembly of institutional grant applications. The unit was created because of the complex 
financial configuration of the center. Indeed, it covers structural and research costs with the 
foundation's internal resources (partly from donations), and with external international funding 
agencies through direct participation in funded consortia or via specific research projects. An 
Internal Advisory Board (IAB) comprising internal group leaders and an External Advisory Board 
(EAB) consisting of external experts completes the organization chart. 
 
 
Table 5: Cases: a synthetic description 
 Ownership Facilities Output 
A private owners 
 






B No profit foundation 
 
One local unit with 20 research 
groups 
 
Basic research  
 
C public consortium  
 
One local unit with 13 research 
groups 
 
diagnostic services and 
basic research 
 
D private owners 
 




Source: our data 
 
 
Cases A and D are represented by two small private biotech firms. Largely focused on research 
services, case A is owned by two persons (CEO and President of the company, indicated by A1 
and A2 in figure94) whose interests lie essentially in the success of their firm. The structural 
dimension of their operation is quite straightforward and includes 4 research laboratories. The 
structural dimension is very simply. There are 4 research labs  providing advanced custom 
services like Antibodies, Peptides, DNA synthesis, DNA sequencing, Protein Analysis and a 
variety of pharmacological services based on the use of a state-of-the-art animal facility.  
Case D is a small private firm mainly focused on the discovery of new agrochemicals and new 
active ingredients for cosmetics applications. Technology development is focused on signal 
transduction pathways of plants, pathogens, pets and mammalian cell systems. The strategic 
combination of  its scientific know-how in plant biology and the experience in drug discovery 
makes this company a very good partner in the identification of novel active compounds for 
cosmetics and agriculture.  
Structural dimension is the simplest of all in that it is composed of one lab and less than 10 
researcher-employees. As the youngest firm we observed (founded in 2004) it is run by three 
managers (two of them are the principal owners of the company). The firm uses capital  
participation on a broad scale, and it has, at the moment, two important partners in two large 
sized firms (B1 and B2 in the figure 9). 
 
Data collection was conducted from January 2008 until December 2010 according to Yin’s 
(1984) call for multiple sources of evidence and collected data through interviews, site visits and 
archival records. There were two distinct data collection phases, the first driven by exploratory 
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research logic (see § 1.2) and the second as per derived research logic (see § 2.4). Primary 
sources included site visits, direct conversations and semi-structured interviews. Our informants 
were the senior scientists (and founders) of the labs who were able to report on the company’s 
development. The semi-structured questionnaire guiding our interviews included questions 
about the individual respondent, the company’s history, organization, performance, and the 
nature of the company's external relationships at each step of the firm’s development. During 
the second phase of data collection (according to the derived research logic) we observed 
collaboration across the hierarchy and organizational boundaries (internally between R&D sites 
and externally with academic scientists). Relational data were collected by means of an SNA 
questionnaire with few questions on communication flow and problem solving.  
Following our exploratory research logic (V = UAB + R&ICs), the data was collected by extracting 
information on the components of the UAB (made up of technological plants, specific 
professional skills and know-how) through their attributes and referred data, and by adopting 
social network analysis, based on relational data, for the purpose of  interpreting R&ICs41.   
During the final stage of data collection and validation, the informants helped us to identify 
more and less all of these relations and provided feedback on the data and their interpretation. 
We gave them brief summaries of the cases while they provided further details on case material 
and clarified open questions.       
A synthetic scheme of our firms’ UAB is given in tab. 6. 
 
Defining how R&ICs lay down the value creation process in the organization is challenging. 
With regard to the relational dimension, we identified the following important links for our 
cases: 
1) Relations with other basic research centers. The link with academic research groups is 
important for both profit and non-profit research organizations. Underlying this need is 
knowledge integration for small private biotech labs, and access to international research 
networks for non-profit research organizations.  
2) Customer relations. If stable and continuous, these links may be of focal concern and 
fundamental to a private biotech's raison d'etre. For non-profit organizations the customer is 
mainly the external evaluator of research or publishers of highly reputable scientific journals. 
3) Relations with other biotech firms. They are highly developed in the case of small biotech 
labs and are engaged with via close and formal ties(like an interlocking board). 
4) Relations with other firms. The source of the relation may be a specific project, but it may 
occasionally evolve into a completely new product/process. If supported by trust nurtured in 
                                                 
41 
An increasing number of contributions use Social Network Analysis (SNA), a set of analytical tools that can be 
used to map networks of relationships and provide an important means of assessing and promoting collaboration 
in strategically important groups (Scott, 2000; Wasserman, Faust, 1994; Carrington, Scott, Wasserman, 2005). 
SNA has roots in social science research that date back to the 1930s. The idea of drawing a picture of the 
connections among a specified group of people is often credited to Dr J.L. Moreno (1934), an early social 
psychologist who envisioned mapping the entire population of New York City. Since that time, the field has grown 
significantly from a methodological standpoint with the advent of the personal computer and a global, 
multidisciplinary society of social network analysts called International Network of Social Network Analysts. 
Significant theoretical contributions have been made to the fields of sociology, social psychology, anthropology, 
epidemiology, and management studies, by virtue of the application of social network techniques. In the field of 
management, interest has tended to focus heavily on issues of social capital  (e.g., Burt, 2000; Leenders, Gabbay, 
1999; Adler, Kwon, 2002); information flow in social networks (e.g., Allen, 1977; Monge, Contractor, 2000);  and 
the informal structure of an organization (e.g., Krackhardt, Hanson, 1993; Nohria, Eccles, 1992; Lincoln, 1982). 
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another job, the meeting between (biotech) scientists and producers can turn out to be full of 
new product ideas. 
 
 
Table 6:  Cases: UABs  
 Labs Employee Know-how 
A 4 30 Dna & Rna synthesis 
Dna sequencing 
Gene cloning and expression 
Peptide synthesis 
Monoclonal antibodies 
B 13 115 Developmental disorders 
Inherited eye diseases 
Inborn errors of metabolism 
Functional genomics and systems biology 
C 16 28 Molecular basis of hereditary diseases 
Molecular basis and therapy of leukemia 
Bio informatics 
Genetic applied to medical problems 
Molecular oncology and tumor genetics 
Neurosciences 
D 1 10 Plant stem cell 
Plant cell biofactories 
Plant stem cell metabolic  engineering  
Source: our data 
 
 
In working with the groups selected, we first obtained the formal organizational chart to see 
how the people were hierarchically connected. We then asked each person within the group 
who they relied on for information to get their work done.  
On this particular point we investigated R&ICs by asking the following questions: 
1) Who (individual or group) is able to relate with external (effective or potential) partners? 
2) Who (individual or group) is able to integrate new information and knowledge from outside 
into the organization?  
From our survey responses to these two questions we produced social network diagrams 
showing the map of effective connections amongst the people in the organization (see fig. 9). A 
specific node of the network may be considered “critical” if it serves as a broker for information 
(Burt, 1992). These nodes, which contribute to reaching external research groups, are 
considered essential for the accumulation of dynamic capabilities. They are recognized for their 
central position in the network (i.e. by the high number of connections they have). Likewise, in 
these kinds of organizations the internal structure is focused on technology, and the distance 
(or physical separation) between the labs may be bridged with informal meetings. It is also 
possible that the critical role played by these meetings will be determined by mid-level/middle 
managers with more structured means.  






Table 7:  Cases:  Formal relations (number) 















A 2 1 1    
B 2   14 5  
C 2    1 1 
D   2    
Source: our data 
 
 
Data Analysis was firstly conducted to explore which part of the organization was more 
involved in value creation. For example, case A showed strong customer care orientation and 
value depends on the ability to interact daily with customers. In addition, for firm A the 
customer is, at the same time, the principal knowledge supplier represented in the main by 
academic research groups. Thus, it is important in this context to find who (individual or group) 
interact more frequently with these external groups. Of course, this first phase also analyzes the 
static component of firm value (UAB) for each case.  
We subsequently expanded our case description by adding the relational data and specifically 
configuring the relationships both inside and outside the firm. The completed case study  was 
finally re-proposed in terms of process-position-path42. We then compared value solution in 
terms of UAB and dynamic capabilities. Interestingly, at the organizational level there is 



















                                                 
42 
This is a possible way to describe a firm’s value configuration using the DC approach. In particular, the model 
refers to the managerial and organizational PROCESS for what might be referred to / addressing a firm's routine or 
patterns of current practice and learning. By POSITION is meant a firm’s current specific endowments of 
technology, intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and its external relations with suppliers 
and complementors. The term PATHS refers to strategic alternatives available to the firm, and the presence or 












CHAPTER 4 -  FINDINGS 
 
 
The following notes will argument the evidences and some logical implications emerging from 
the research path. The notes will be grouped in three key-issues connected to the structural 
configuration of the firms’ organizational settings, to the value solutions expressed in terms of  
process-position-path, and to a final implication on regard of governance and incentive issues.  
A final discussion will be given about the main concordance and/or differences between our 
observation and the theoretical model.  
 
 
A. Configuration of BFs’ relational and integrative capabilities and value implications 
We identified two different structures in the firms’ organizational settings (see figure 9). A quite 
simple formal setting corresponding to the institution's dominant rules (indicated in figure 9 by 
unbroken lines), and the informal network arising from communication flow (indicated in the 
same picture with dotted lines), centered mostly on few critical nodes43. 
We start from a declarative setting to observe the dominant structural dimension. Basically, the 
non-profit organizations appear to be organized in different research groups-labs guided by a 
principal investigator whose focus is on their specific research activity. Management functions 
are distributed among few  top divisions devoted to administration and coordination. The few 
tenured positions are occupied by technicians/technical staff, while research groups are made 
up of PhD students or University fellows. The private organizations are similarly based on  
groups directed by a research leader, are smaller than the no-profit organizations and almost all 
researchers occupy stable contractual positions. 
In all cases, the different informal structure of the organization bears witness to the importance 
of information and communication flow for these firms. 
When viewing the picture, it becomes evident that R&ICs are concentrated in few critical 
nodes. Clearly, their position is central in the firm’s value creation process.  Any  strategic 
activity with external actors is mainly performed by top managers. Even the role of integrating 
information internally is played by few central connectors, sometimes positioned at middle 
                                                 
43 Organizational theorists have already given ample consideration to the difference between declarative (formal) 
and effective (informal) setting where an appropriate connectivity can have a substantial impact on performance, 
learning and innovation (Krackhardt, Hanson, 1993; Tsai, Ghoshal, 1998; Hansen, 1999; Cross, Borgatti, Parker, 
2002; Cross, Prusak, 2002). Benefits also accrue from well-connected networks between organizations (Uzzi, 1996; 
Gulati, 1995). More recently, other research works suggest a comprehensive application of network analysis to the 
work of managers and leaders (Cross, Parker, 2004). In this respect, “making invisible work visible” may help 
mangers build and improve networks in their organizations. 
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level in the hierarchy. Especially in case A, value is guaranteed by the role (in terms of relational 
abilities) of node A1, A2 and  by node 4 (in terms of integrative ability). Node A1 (the company's 
CEO) is informally linked to the University (on account of his personal previous experience), 
while node A2 (the President of the company) is in formally linked to some external actors (as 
vice-president of the local biotech professional association and as CEO of another biotech firm. 
This position is already known as a board interlock). Inside, the nodes showing the highest 
number of links are signaled by the numbers 2, 2, 3 and 4  (corresponding ties). Thus, while 
external relations are guaranteed by A1 and A2 nodes, the integration of information and 
knowledge inside the firm is guaranteed by nodes 2, 2, 3 and 4. The integrative capabilities are 
expressed in particular by the chief administrator (4) and by a researcher (3) who is very active 
in networking. 
In case B,  the scientific officer (A) is a critical connector and so too is a group (indicated by the 
dotted circle in the figure and often represented by the so-called Data Clubs). Undoubtedly, a 
strategic role is also played by the scientific director (D) who, in wishing to maintain his high 
scientific reputation, fosters important external relations with the international scientific 
community. We omitted to draw the personal scientific community of which everyone is widely 
endowed. 
In case C, all the relational activity is concentrated in node D (scientific director).  Owing to the 
high concentration of power in this figure, this research network may be considered 
substantially weak.  Since the Center also operates as an incubator of new small science-based 
firms, it plays an important role in local development. 
Case D is a small firm gemmed from incubator activity, a spin-off of case C. It started its 
operations in 2004 inside the incubator and since 2007 it has an autonomous location and a 
considerable range of partners. The basic business model consists in the strategic combination 
of its scientific know-how in molecular biology and cell biology with the know-how in chemistry 
and agronomy of its industrial partners. The identification of new lead compounds (these serve 
to develop diagnostic systems for specific needs) emerge from this kind of relationship. Its 
small, simple, horizontal and flexible organization revolves around the central figure of the 
firm's founder and CEO who may be considered a star scientist44 for the entrepreneurial value 
she has given to the group’s significant new discoveries. Most of the partnerships from which 
her new ideas arise, stem from her ability in social entrepreneurship45. 
 
Downstream of these observations, the logic of research followed, and, remember, a collection 
of relational data, based on problem solving and communication process (see par. 3.2), we can 
argue that:  without individuals valuable informal relations, these firms would be unable to 
acquire, recombine and release resource useful to (i) create and maintain productive customer 
relations, (ii) to have access into international research networks, (iii) to promote occasional 
meetings with potential “lateral thinkers”. Moreover, weak ties (or the simply periodical Data 
                                                 
44 
“Until recently, economists and sociologists studying science and technology have been averse to viewing 
scientists as pursuing private motives, viewing them instead as disinterested contributors to a shared common pool 
of knowledge. Our results suggest that star scientists often are better viewed as entrepreneurial individuals who 
value both financial rewards and the pleasure, recognition, and resources that come from being the first to make a 
significant new discovery” (Zucker, Darby, 2007. NBER web pages). 
45 We refer to her ability to promote occasions/situations wherein different (scientific and technical) skills may 
meet. And, in general, to her ability to foster social relations. A related work concerning the social 
entrepreneurship enforcing DCs, may be Persico, Vittoria (2010). 
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Clubs) facilitate internal knowledge diffusion and the continuous upgrading of “what we know” 
in the organizations. 
Other elements such as formal organic networks, firm technical equipments, high-skilled human 
resources are also required. These elements may be considered in a close complementarity with 
informal relations. 
 
Proposition 1: In biotech research-based organizations,  the informal 
relations are strictly complementary with firm’s specific and difficult-to-trade 
resource endowments for value creation.   
 
 
B. Evidence in terms of process-position-path and convergence solutions 
If informal relations enable the firm to fill the internal information gaps or to gain more 
occasions of capturing external knowledge, the question become: are informal relations also 
easy to acquire?  
Or, how easy is to have an access in an informal scientific community? And, who is the critical 
partner of an informal relation in these contexts? 
In collecting our observations in terms of process-position-path (see tab. 8), we try to reach a 
more extensive comprehension of the mode of acquisition of informal relations. 
According to the DC theoretical view, the term “process” means “to refer to the way things are 
done in the firm, or what it may be referred to as its routines or patterns of current practices 
and learning” (Teece at al., 1997. pg. 518). On this level, our cases – viewed as informational 
networks – may be considered polarized groups in which the main managerial practices are 
governed by few critical nodes (top mangers, Scientific Directors etc.). Looking at learning 
needs, which are partly solved in our organizations by the selection of personnel, we found a 
close resemblance (or integration with) to the Human Resources (HR) management practices of 
the public university system. Indeed, with few exceptions, research groups are made up of post-
graduates pursuing an academic career.  
Of course, this closeness is more evident when we look at non-profit research centers, while for 
private enterprises the process is necessarily different. In the latter, we find visiting researchers 
or scientists attending a firm's laboratory on an informal basis.   In both profit and no-profit  
situations the learning need is addressed via relational investment, quite often based on the 
high scientific reputation of the people involved. Because of the information and knowledge 
dominion in these fields, people may interact more directly with those they already know and 
trust. One possible problem, for these firms, is to find “who knows what they need”. It may 
happen only after the organization has “known what it knows”. All processes requiring a kind of  
“reputation management” consist in helping employees develop an awareness of and trust in 
their partners’ expertise throughout the network. Here we find “implicit” reputation 
management with a concentration of power (in terms of information and frequency of 
connections) in few critical nodes. 
With the term “position”, the DCs theoretical view means to “refer to a firm’s current specific 
endowments of technology , intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and 
its external relations with suppliers and complementors” (Teece at al., 1997. pg. 518). 
In the firms we observed, there is evidence of an important endowment of technologies and 
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 A B C D Basic tool for 
R&ICs 




Star Scientist High scientific 
reputation 





















Path Since its foundation 




success as one of 
the most attending  
research partner of 
academic groups.  
Two highly skilled 
scientists/managers 
and founders are 




internally is due to 
a few critical nodes 




1994,    this 
international 
reference centre 
was created by 









































There are some 
successful 
initiatives  






 High scientific 
reputation 











External relations are numerous and differ in type.  The non-profit organizations are in stable, 
formal relationships with the Scientific and Technology Parks that host them. They have many 
formal links with international funding agencies through different projects. Almost all the 
researchers belong to a wide, informal, scientific community. The private cases (A and D) have a 
multiple external network, both formal and informal. For example, case A is characterized by 
two board interlocks in the simultaneous presence of A2 (the company president) on the board 
of another biotech firm in addition to that of the local biotech Professional Association. 
Conversely, case D is characterized by direct participation in the capital of two companies.  
The term “path” in the DCs theoretical view means to refer to whatever concerns the history of 
the firm that, in different ways, defines its strategic alternatives as well as ensuring the 
presence or absence of increasing returns and attendant path dependencies.  
Biotechnological environment is characterized by the rapidity with which new scientific 
breakthroughs are being made, and this context contributes to defining a strong path 
dependency for both organizations surveyed. 
If we look at the case histories of A and B, we find a growing investment activity in new 
research groups and in new lines of research/services. What does the strategic approach to 
such choices guarantee? With an almost fixed core in technology and plant, how easy is it to 
transform or reconfigure a group of research onto new themes? 
With regard to these problems, strong evidence is provided by the direct/formal participation 
of firm A on the board of another biotech firm (board interlock) or in the board of the local 
biotech association. In case B, there is the external network (formal and informal) comprising 
different research projects. Since its creation, the Centre has progressively moved from 
focusing principally on the identification of genes responsible for genetic diseases to the study 
of gene function and disease mechanisms. It is now making a significant move towards clinical 
applications. A critical node in this process is represented by its funding strategy. 
In both these two cases a common solution is in the possibility to have an access to funding 
agencies. At the base of this possibility there is the high scientific reputation of both the 
company president (node A2) and of scientific director (node D). 
 
In sum, while informal relations play a central role in helping BFs to acquire and integrate key 
resources (knowledge and information) for value creation, scientific reputation is the pass-
partout or the key of their appropriation.  
 
 Proposition 2: The informal relations underlying BFs’ value creation are 
acquired only if supported by a high scientific reputation of both relational 
partners 
 
In addition, considering scientific reputation and informal relations as  intangible assets to 
recognize and address to reach firm’s value, we can argue another conclusion, as follows: 
 
 Proposition 2a: under a network domain, strategic process would itself 
move toward an in-depth consideration of intangible assets.  
 
More precisely, in case study A the value creation process may be considered the result of a 
kind of learning-by-time process. Starting from a unique asset base (UAB) of the firm, mainly 
expressed in DNA sequencing competencies, it moves progressively towards a more and more 
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customized research service. In this process, the customer relation, mainly informal and 
frequent, is the critical replication dimension. 
In this relation, in which the customer is often represented by academic research groups, 
converges the main part of knowledge flow and key processes and firm routines. Here, a high 
degree of reputation may support these informal relations and knowledge flow. 
In case study B, on the other hand, the value creation process may be viewed as the result of a 
kind of stay-at-the-forefront research process.  It starts from a UAB of the firm, mainly 
expressed in the identification of genes responsible for genetic diseases, and moves 
progressively  towards a more applied kind of research. In this process, integrative and 
relational capabilities (I&RCs) are represented by specific internal figures (Chief Scientific 
Officer) and groups (so called Data Clubs for achieving research complementarities) and also by 
the participation in prestigious international research networks. In this processes, the recurrent 
critical resource is reputation and it lies at the base of a firm's R&ICs. 
For case study C, the initial technical and professional endowment is associated with its own 
capital structure. It is a consortium, naturally linked with local and national institutions and, as 
such, access to public finance is in this way guaranteed. R&ICs converged in the figure of 
Scientific Director, a scientist-entrepreneur with a high scientific reputation. 
The value creation process in case study D started out from the personal (scientific and 
entrepreneurial) ability of the founder who maintains external strategic links by herself, and 
there is evidence of increasing expansion of different partnerships in the course of the firm’s 
evolution. Inside, she promotes a flexible and horizontal organization in a successful and 
dynamic experience/way.   
To close, we draw on two basic strands of evidence. First, we notice there is a specific link 
between reputation and dynamic capabilities in a research-based biotech firm. Second, if DCs 
rely on reputation both in profit and no-profit contexts, this would be linked  to a 
strategic/convenience issue; despite the classical cost accounting approach, the strategic 
process would itself move toward an in-depth consideration of intangible assets.  
 
 
C. Basic vs applied research network: governance and incentive issues 
Can we add something to the discussion presented in section 3.1. with regard to the expected 
evolution of governance and incentive researches advanced by Powell and Grodal (2006)?  
Substantially,  the authors maintain the importance of interpreting dynamic aspects of 
relationships. “Initially, the choice by a young firm of whom to partner with is often driven by 
resource needs. As both firms and network mature, various dyadic choices increasingly reflect 
structural properties of the network” (Powell, Grodal, op. cit. pg 77). From our research and 
observation of the cases, the influence of research behavior on network structure may be 
confirmed. Or, rather, the network structure, mainly polarized amongst few critical connectors, 
explains the dominant management model of these firms, and makes us talk of the importance 
of reputation management as a convergent solution for our cases.  
In this convergence solution we may briefly reflect on governance and incentive problems of 
scientific knowledge as economic assets.  
Scientific knowledge has always raised problems of estimating its economic value.  
“Knowledge is put to use and uses confer value. ….One of the chief functions of economies is to 
promote standard instruments of exchange, and when we say that an article published in 
Nature costs $ 2.50 for the reader to reproduce, then we have, indeed, said something about 
value, but not anything important or discriminating about value” (Bozeman, 2007. pg. 130). 
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Thus, what is the convenience of investing in some sort of relationship in exchange for scientific 
knowledge?  
In short, It is a network convenience. Here, the value concept of scientific knowledge is in the 
measure of the reciprocity for all the participants.  
Among the doctrinal approaches, that of Powell and Grodal stresses the organizational 
dimension by exploring the costs and opportunity of alliances investments. For example, the 
extent to which one considers it to be convenient to maintain a kind of partnership. There may 
be costs associated with managing a partnership or terminating it, or problems of stagnation 
that occur in some long-term associations. 
For wider contexts, in which public and private actors are involved, as in an extended biotech 
research network, it may become a governance problem. Where, as we have seen in our case 
study research, some social aspects, such as trust and reputation, can play a more efficient role 
than money. 
Another appropriate framework may be provided by a cooperation theory that includes the we-
rationality or, in other words, a theory based on selection criteria centered on “sociality” and 
“relationality” in a non-individualistic perspective.  
Along this path may be positioned the analytical proposal of Bacharach (1993; 1999; 2000; 
2006) and Sungden (1993; 2000; 2003), on the border between economics and philosophy. 
Their idea lies in a new conception of rationality founded not on individual interest but on a 
collective convenience. Based on the fundamental criticism of the game theory (widely known 
through the example of “prisoner dilemma”), the we-rationality framework discusses the 
decision to cooperate according to a rationality based on the “we”. In pursuing this framework, 
the doctrine reaches the point of discussion concerning incentives.  
On this specific topic, interesting implications are drawn by Frey (1997) when, introducing the 
motivation crowding out effect, he says that incentives, particularly monetary rewards, have a 
damaging effect on intrinsic motivation46 , and then on performance.    
Other opinions (Smerilli, 2006) explain the crowding out effect through we-reasoning and not 
with intrinsic motivation. In other words, motivation may be explained through  “membership 
in a community” or  “identification with a group”. Here the presence of incentives or sanctions 




In selecting four success cases operating in the biotech research system located in southern 
Italy, we decided to focus directly to their organizational/governance solutions in value creating 
process.  
This means that general research question , “how to address basic research supply in southern 
Italy”, if translated in terms of the DCs theoretical view and applied at firm-level, has become 
“how southern Italy BFs recognized and apply R&I capabilities for value”. In other words, the 
places where basic and applied research meet, now become a “critical zone” for value creation. 
This still means to assume the coincidence between theoretical and operational value 
conditions. 
In effect from what is apparent from direct observation of cases, the critical areas which link 
basic and applied research (or:  the firm observed with University, customer, occasional and 
                                                 
46 Following Deci (1975), Frey defines an “intrinsic motivated” person, who is able to conduct an action when he 
doesn’t receive any rewards, except the activity itself. 
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fruitful “lateral thinkers”, scientific communities, etc.) are composed of a constellation of 
informal relations. These kind of relations concur with other resources in value creation (see 
proposition 1 and a synthetic summary in the table 9).   
 
Table 9:  Cases: Informal relations 
• maintain a constant link with some academic groups…through frequent and reciprocal informal 
visits (case A, B, D) 
• maintain a stable and effective customer relation….through a daily communication flow (phone, 
e-mail, etc.) (case A) 
• create internal structures for professional learning…internal professional figures as bridging 
nodes (case A, B) 
• create occasional meetings with production experts of different sectors… capacity relating to 
the social capital of specific individuals (case D) 
Source: our elaboration 
 
 
The access to this kind of relation is made possible by the high scientific reputation of both 
partners (see proposition 2). 
The inclusion of reputation and informal relations in the category of firm’s  intangible assets 
contribute to enlarge strategic process to other possible tools (see proposition 2a). 
The present research confirm relational investment as a kind of firm’s dynamic capability in this 
contexts. It stresses the importance, among the various relational links, of informal relations 
and underline the crucial role of reputation.  
In other words, we can accept largely the theoretical implication on the critical role of 
organizational variable in capturing competitive advantages for biotechnological research-based 
organizations. While we put in evidence the need of an integration of the same model on regard 
of the deeply organizational analysis. Finally, on regard of governance and incentive problems, 
more researches are needed to establish the point of convenience between formal and informal 
safeguards to govern intellectual property.  
While ever more evidences have underscored high levels of effectiveness of informal safeguards 
(trust, reputation) in controlling opportunistic behavior in alliance relationships (see Dyer, 1996; 


























CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
   
This work has addressed the question of finding solutions, in terms of strategic management, to 
the issue of harmonization between basic and applied research in the field of biotechnologies. 
The problem has been explored by adopting a case study approach on organizations selected 
from the biotechnology sector in southern Italy. 
 
For these organizations, the present research shows the importance of relational investment, 
also on an informal base. These informal relations can assist in the selection of the right 
partner/interlocutor in the complex dynamic between basic and applied research. 
The present research has codified informal relations for BFs in the following forms: 
• Community or network practices; 
• Bridging structural holes or connecting different functions (via  different communicative 
means as well as the action of boundary-spanners); 
• Meeting “lateral thinkers” (facilitating occasional meetings with production experts). 
 
At the same time, we recognized reputation as an intangible asset insofar as it may regulate (in 
terms of engaging, maintaining or ending) an informal network.   
 
 
We summarize the research structure as follows: 
 
 In accordance with qualitative research methods, we started from a broad definition of 
the research target (see Fig. 1). Only after our first contact with some successful organizations 
(our initial case studies) and an in-depth investigation of the theory were we able to focus 
better on the research questions (to see in Fig. 2). 
 Thereafter, the research process embraced the DCs theoretical framework as a guideline 
for exploring and discussing the empirical evidence, whereas the derived research logic has 
been formulated in the following statements: 
1. research-based biotech organizations may be seen as acting in a fast-moving business 
environment; 
2. in this context, two macro-level capabilities called Relational and Integrative capabilities 
(R&ICs) are recognized as critical,. 
3. firm value is provided by two, static and dynamic, basic resource endowment 
components; 
4. the static component is the Unique Asset Base (UAB) of the firm, and the dynamic 
component, expressed by the doctrine as DCs, has been interpreted in terms of R&ICs. 
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5. in our case studies, firm value has been interpreted as the sum of these two basic 
components.  
6. if the organization recognizes and applies these two components for value creation, it 
means that it has found the right strategic prescription, in other words harmonization 
between basic and applied research. 
 
The methodological steps together with theoretical upgrading are described in chapters 2  and 
3.  
Briefly, we would like to underline that one of the major critical points in this regard consists in 
the identification of DCs at firm-level. As these abilities are in a continuous state of flux and in 
fast-moving environments, it is important to try to anticipate, as far as possible, the most 
important external constraints and monitor their permanence/absence in the period examined. 
Indeed, in the biotechnology sector and the southern Italian institutional context they may 
change. Undoubtedly, knowledge diffusion in the biotechnology field is associated with the 
relational need. If incoming, external information is acquired, then an integrative need, to 
include new knowledge in the organization, emerges. In this dynamic, informal linkages are very 
important, and for this reason we felt it was important to use a method of observation based on 
both attribute and relational data. 
 
The evidence gathered converges on the following issues:  
A. Configuration of BFs’ relational and integrative capabilities and value implications.  What 
emerges in this issue is a polarized network configuration described as numerous 
informal links aggregated around critical nodes for value creation. 
 
B. Evidence in terms of process-position-path and convergence solutions. Each case, 
observed in its strategic tension in seeking competitive advantage, may be described  in 
terms of process-position-path. What emerges is a common organizational solution in 
terms of reputation management for all the cases we investigated. Intangible assets 
underpinning the strategic process in BFs. In terms of the strategic process it is 
important to consider the intangible assets, such as the social dimension at the base of 
an increasing number of procedures, and equally important for them to be “measured” 
and, if necessary, acquired and correctly managed.  
 
C. Basic vs applied research network: governance and incentive issues. Network dominion 
governance and incentive issues may be treated in a we-rationality framework, in which 




In short, our findings suggest that the use of boundary-spanning social networks by the 
four biotech firms we observed increases both their learning and their flexibility in ways that 
would not be possible within a self-contained hierarchical organization. In this environment 
reputation is a key-management tool to know and use and, as such, it may be considered an 





To relate these findings in the whole research process, we can say that our research: 
a. accepts the theoretical implications of the DCs model (in the critical role of 
organization variable in capturing competitive advantages) for biotechnological 
research-based firms; 
b. proposes the integration in the same model of additional analytical tools for 
organizational analysis; 
c. highlights the need to extend to other theoretical approach the analysis of the 
incentives to conduct in the field of network governance. 
d. Finally, with respect to the general research target and, specifically, to the expected 
role of the state, our research may suggest a “basic and applied research model” in 
the biotech field, substantially based on “actions” and no more on “actors”. In other 
words, in order to provide efficient and effective support to the relationship 
between basic and applied research in the field of biotechnologies, it will be 
necessary to sustain the creation of conducive environments for selecting "social 
value" (or to create and capture new knowledge) and, therefore, collaboration.  
 
  
   
Future research steps may seek to advance the dynamic capabilities perspective on the 
value creation process. Accordingly, we will try to test the role of formal and informal relations 
in accelerating the knowledge and information diffusion on a wider sample of cases.  
We propose that knowledge derived from informal relations (codified in the categories shown 
in fig. 3b) increases the likelihood of new innovative opportunities while stable, formal 
connections ensure the organization maintains the support of reputation. We also intend to 
argue that the extent to which the strategic process opens up to intangible assets or focuses on 
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